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An American Perspective on
Environmental Impact Assessment in
Australia
Mark Squillace*
Criticizing foreign law seems a dubious enterprise for itinerant
foreign scholars. Even assuming that one can develop a sufficient
understanding of the legal and political systems which form the
foundation for that law (a substantial assumption), it seems unlikely
that a transient visitor can appreciate fully the social and cultural
conditions which have influenced that law. Add to this the fact that
foreign scholars are saddled with biases based on their own limited
experiences and cultural traditions, and one might well ask the
value of such a critique.
Having engaged in a lengthy study of environmental decision-
making in Australia,' I am, no doubt, predisposed toward arguing
the merits of foreign scholarship. However, I am persuaded that it
can serve useful purposes if its limitations are understood. Foreign
scholarship, for example, offers a new perspective on local law
which can provide valuable insights into problem-solving. This new
perspective can be particularly helpful if it compares' the success of
local laws with the success of similar laws in other countries. Just as
importantly, perhaps, foreign scholarship broadens the scholar's
own limited perspective and offers an opportunity for the scholar to
gain a better appreciation of the law.
The following summarizes my research and findings on environ-
mental impact assessment ("ELA") in Australia. 2 It also seeks to
* Winston S. Howard Professor of Law, University of Wyoming. J.D., University of Utah,
1978; B.S., Michigan State University, 1974.
1. This project was undertaken in conjunction with a Senior Fulbright Scholar award. I
am grateful not only for the financial support provided by this award, but for the freedom
that it provided to pursue my interests, and the access that it provided to test my ideas. I am
also grateful for the support provided by the George William Hopper Faculty Research Fund
at the University of Wyoming College of Law, and for the warmth, collegiality and support of
my Australian host, the Faculty of Law at the Australian National University in Canberra.
2. In carrying out research for this article, I have reviewed numerous draft and final envi-
ronmental impact statements, government assessments of those statements, other supporting
documentation, and inquiry reports. I studied several projects in substantial detail as a
means of better understanding the EIA process in Australia. I did extensive EIA while work-
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compare my findings regarding the Australian system with the
American EIA experience. It is my hope, however, that this study
will be of value to persons interested in EIA throughout the world.
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of assessing the environmental impacts of proposed ac-
tions before they are allowed to proceed had its genesis in the U.S.
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), which became law on
January 1, 1970.3 Since that time many countries and regional gov-
ernments have embraced the concept of environmental impact as-
sessment ("EIA") as a means for aiding their decision-making
processes. Australia was an early convert to environmental impact
assessment, having adopted national legislation - the Environmen-
tal Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act [hereinafter "Impact Act"]
- in 1974.4 Since that time, each Australian state and territory has
adopted its own EIA process, although not all of these processes are
established by legislation. 5 In this regard, Australia is well ahead of
ing as an attorney with the Bureau of Land Management from 1976 to 1978, and with the
Office of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior, from 1978 to 1981. Since leaving the
government in 1981, I have been involved in environmental advocacy work and academic
research related to EIA.
3. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4374 (1988)).
Ironically, NEPA's popular environmental impact statement ("EIS") requirement may be
more an accident of history than a carefully conceived policy. The original idea for the EIS is
generally credited to Dr. Lynton Caldwell, a political science professor at Indiana University.
In testimony before the Senate Committee for Interior and Insular Affairs, Dr. Caldwell
urged that Senator Henry Jackson's proposed National Environmental Policy Act be
amended to require federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impact of actions which
they proposed to take. While Senator Jackson was sympathetic to this idea, the law was re-
drafted to require only that federal agencies make a "finding" concerning the probable envi-
ronmental impacts of any major federal actions which they proposed to undertake. The bill
passed the U.S. Senate in this form. When the bill reached the U.S. House of Representa-
tives, Congressman Wayne Aspinall introduced an amendment which would have frustrated
the purpose behind the "finding" requirement. While Aspinall's amendment did not actu-
ally change the "finding" requirement, it incorporated new language which was to make clear
that NEPA would not change the authority and responsibility of existing agencies. The
House bill was passed with Congressman Aspinall's amendment. In the meantime, Senators
Jackson and Edmund Muskie had agreed to replace the finding requirement with the re-
quirement for a "detailed statement." The Conference Committee accepted this agreement
and in December 1969, both Houses passed the revised bill. It was signed by President Nixon
on January 1, 1970. This "detailed statement," of course, is what we now call an environmen-
tal impact statement. NEPA's history is described in detail in FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, NEPA
IN THE COURTS 1-14 (1973); RicHARD N.L. ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL Pouacy AND ADMINISTRA-
TIVE CHANGE 7-19 (1976).
4. No. 164, 1974 Austl. Acts 1843 (1974).
5. See DOUGLAS E. FISHER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 409-437 (1993); GERRY M. BATES, ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 93-125 (3d ed. 1992); AUSTRALAN CONSERVATION FOUNDATION,
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the United States. While the federal program is a fixture of Ameri-
can environmental law, only about one half of all American states
have adopted their own EIA processes, and many of these lag far
behind the federal program.
6
Although EIA legislation has become commonplace throughout
the world, marked contrasts exist in the manner in which EIA has
developed and been implemented. Some of these differences can
be traced to the legal systems that exist in particular countries.
Others, however, stem, in large part, simply from policy differences
in the interpretation and implementation of key aspects of the EIA
process. The following analysis focuses on the EIA process in Aus-
tralia and compares that process with EIA in the United States.
Weaknesses in both processes are highlighted and, where appropri-
ate, changes are recommended. In particular, the Australian EIA
system would be greatly improved if EIA preparation were taken
away from the project proponent, particularly when the project pro-
ponent is a private concern. America's EIA system would benefit
from the establishment of an inquiry process that would allow a
more objective and focused look at controversial proposals, particu-
larly those involving regional or programmatic actions.
II. BACKGROUND
Differences in Australian and American constitutional law and
administrative and judicial processes help to explain some of the
differences in the way in which EIA has evolved in the two coun-
tries. 7 Some of these differences are discussed in the context of the
particular issues to which they relate. The key differences are sum-
SUBMISSION TO THE RESOURCE ASSESSMENT COMMISSION COASTAL ZONE INQUIRY Appendix A
(Apr. 1993) (on file with the author) (containing a general discussion of EIA processes
throughout Australia, and comparing commonwealth, state and territory EIA processes).
6. As of 1992, 16 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had adopted EIA legisla-
tion. An additional 10 states had established limited EIA procedures by executive order,
administrative directive, or in the context of narrower substantive legislation. See 22 CoUNcIL
ENVrL. QUALITY ANN. REP. app. (1992). See also Jeffrey T. Renz, The Coming of Age of State
Environmental Policy Acts, 5 PUB. LAND L. Rav. 31 (1984); Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA's Progeny:
State Environmental Policy Acts, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,090 (Dec. 1973).
7. The High Court of Australia has recognized the important legal implications of these
differences:
Although we naturally regard the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
with the greatest respect, it must never be forgotten that they are often given against a
different constitutional, legal and social background from that which exists in Australia.
Australian Conservation Found., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 146 C.L.R 493, 530 (Austl. 1980).
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marized here to provide the necessary background for the reader
who is unfamiliar with one or both legal systems.
A. Constitutional Law
While important environmental initiatives in the EIA area are be-
ing carried out by both American and Australian states, the focus of
this article will be on federal law and policy. 8 For this reason, the
source and scope of federal power to develop and implement an
EIA program must be considered.
Although neither the Australian nor the American Constitution
specifically mentions the environment, broad federal authority to
address environmental issues most likely exists under both legal sys-
tems.9 The principal source of this authority under the American
Constitution is the "commerce clause." 10 The U.S. Supreme Court
has construed the commerce clause to extend not only to the chan-
nels of interstate and foreign commerce and the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce or persons or things in commerce but also
to "activities affecting commerce."1 1 The commerce clause author-
ity thus supports the regulation of virtually all forms of pollution
12
8. The limited scope of this article is potentially problematic since Australian states, unlike
their American counterparts, are in many respects far ahead of the federal government in
developing and implementing EIA processes. This fact, however, underscores an important
difference in the balance of power which distinguishes the Australian system of federalism
from the system in the United States. Constitutional and political considerations should ex-
plain the reasons for these differences.
9. Despite this broad federal authority, commentators in both countries have called for a
constitutional amendment to protect the environment. See, e.g., Lynton Caldwell, NEPA Re-
visited: A Call for A Constitutional Amendment, ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 18; Phillip Toyne,
Federal, State and Local Government Relationships on Environmental Regulation (1993)
(paper presented to the Australian National Environmental Law Association's Annual Meet-
ing). Toyne notes the recommendations of the Australian Conservation Foundation to add
new authority in section 51 of the Australian Constitution, which would empower the Parlia-
ment to make laws with respect to the discharge of substances onto land, air or water affect-
ing more than one state or territory; the prevention of land, air or water degradation
affecting more than one state or territory; the use of nuclear fuels, nuclear energy and ioniz-
ing radiation; the protection of areas of Australia of national and international significance;
and the protection of species of flora or fauna from extinction. Toyne, Federal, State and
Local Government Relationships on Environmental Regulation, supra.
10. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
11. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,277 (1981). See
also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975) ("Even activity that is purely intrastate in
character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by
others similarly situated affects commerce among the states or with foreign nations.").
12. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. at 547.
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as well as the regulation of wildlife. 13 In addition to the commerce
clause, the U.S. Congress may rely on the property clause 14 for mat-
ters that affect the substantial federal land holdings 15 and the treaty
power 16 for matters affecting federal treaty obligations.' 7 The only
significant limitation on federal authority is found in the tenth
amendment, 18 which has been construed to preclude the federal
government from imposing a direct regulatory mandate on the
states.' 9
13. The federal authority to regulate wildlife under the commerce clause has been applied
to both migratory and nonmigratory species. For example, in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51
(1979), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that "the underlying assumption that the national
commerce power does not reach migratory wildlife is clearly flawed." Id. at 63 n.19. In Palila
v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd on
other grounds, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981), the Federal District Court for the District of Ha-
waii held that authority over nonmigratory species may be exercised under commerce clause
powers: "[A] national program to protect and improve the natural habitats of endangered
species preserves the possibilities of interstate commerce in these [nonmigratory] species
and of interstate movement of persons, such as amateur students of nature or professional
scientists who come to a state to observe and study these species." Id. at 995. Moreover, the
federal commerce clause authority in the U.S. Constitution may prevent a state from regulat-
ing activities in a manner that discriminates against persons from other states, even where the
federal government has chosen not to regulate in that field. Recent examples of state laws
which have been struck down on these grounds include laws regulating the disposal of haz-
ardous waste, Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992), and laws regulat-
ing the disposal of solid wastes, Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't. of Natural
Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
14. U.S. CONST., amend. V.
15. See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
16. U.S. CONsT., art. II, § 2.
17. See MICHAELJ. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAw 19-21 (1983).
18. U.S. CONST., amend. X.
19. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (involving a challenge to certain
provisions of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021 (b-j) (1988)). The statute at issue in New York established incentives to encourage
states to address the disposal of low level radioactive wastes that were generated within their
borders. Three particular provisions were at issue. The first allowed states with disposal sites
to impose a surcharge on wastes generated in other states. The second allowed states to deny
other states access to their disposal sites, if those states failed to meet certain deadlines im-
posed under the Act. Finally, states which failed to address the disposal of domestic low level
wastes as required by the law could be required to take title of those wastes upon the request
of the generator, or to be held liable for damages resulting from the state's failure to take
tide. The Court had no trouble upholding the first two provisions under a traditional com-
merce clause analysis. The "take title" provisions, however, were found wanting because they
had "commandee[red] the legislative processes of the states by directly compelling them to
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program." Id. at 2428 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). According to Justice
O'Connor, this provision "crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion."
New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2428.
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The scope of federal authority in Australia to regulate for envi-
ronmental protection has been the subject of scholarly debate for
many years.20 Professor James Crawford has outlined a broad suite
of constitutional powers which, individually or collectively, might be
used to support environmental legislation at the national level.
These include the Commonwealth's plenary power to legislate with
respect to the territories,2 1 the power to tax and spend,22 the exter-
nal affairs power,23 the corporations power,24 the trade and com-
merce power, 25 and the power to make special laws for the people
of any race, including the Aboriginal people of Australia.2 6 Fur-
thermore, recent decisions from the Australian High Court suggest
a predilection to construe these federal powers broadly. For exam-
ple, in Murphyores Incorporated Party, Ltd. v. Commonwealth,27 the
High Court sustained the right of the Commonwealth to consider
environmental factors in accordance with the Impact Act 28 in decid-
ing whether to approve mineral exports from proposed sand min-
ing operations on Fraser Island. In so doing, the Court expressly
rejected Murphyores' claim that the Commonwealth's power to reg-
ulate trade and commerce, which was the basis for the Common-
wealth's authority to approve the proposed exports, precluded
consideration of matters that were not directly related to
commerce.
Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Tasmania,2 9 the Court sustained the
Commonwealth's authority under the external affairs power to
block construction of the Franklin below Gordon Dam, which was
to be located in an area listed under the World Heritage Conven-
tion.30 According to the Court, so long as federal legislation imple-
20. SeeJames Crawford, The Constitution and the Environment, 13 SYDNEv L. REv. 11 (1991)
(especially the materials referred to in notes 4-7). See also, James Crawford, The Constitution, in
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND LEGAL CHANGE (Tim Bonyhady ed., 1992) [hereinafter EN-
VIRONMENTAL PROTFECrION AND LEGAL CHANGE]; Rob J. Fowler, Proposal for a Federal Envi-
ronment Protection Agency v-xii Uan. 1991) (report prepared for the Australian
Conservation Foundation and Greenpeace).
21. Aus-rRL. CONST., ch. VI, § 122; see also Crawford, supra note 20, at 16.
22. AusTRL. CONST., ch. I, pt. V, § 51(ii); ch. IV, §§ 81-83, 96; see also Crawford, supra note
20, at 17-21.
23. AusTrs. CONST., ch. I, pt. V, § 51 (xxix); see also Crawford, supra note 20, at 21-24.
24. AusTRL. CONST., ch. I, pt. V, § 51 (xx); see also Crawford, supra note 20, at 24-25.
25. Ausmi.. CONST., ch. I, pt. V, § 51(i); see also Crawford, supra note 20, at 26.
26. Aus-rL. CONST., ch. I, pt. V, § 51 (xxvi); see also Crawford, supra note 20, at 26-27.
27. 136 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1976).
28. No. 164, 1974 Austl. Acts 1843 (1974).
29. 158 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1983).
30. World Heritage Convention, done November 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37.
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ments a treaty to which Australia is a signatory nation, it is
unnecessary for the Commonwealth to demonstrate international
concern.
3 1
To be sure, the Australian federal government's constitutional
authority to protect the environment might be clarified, and some
have argued that express language of a general or specific nature
should be included in the constitution.3 2 A 1988 report from a fed-
eral constitutional commission rejected these arguments, however,
largely on the grounds suggested above, that sufficient federal au-
thority over the environment already exists under the present
constitution.3
3
In sum, despite protestations to the contrary by Government offi-
cials,3 4 the Commonwealth's authority to regulate in the environ-
mental arena is limited more by political will than constitutional
infirmity.
B. Political Institutions
The political system in Australia incorporates an interesting mix
of the British Westminster system of government and the American
system of checks and balances. The emphasis, however, seems
much more British than American, particularly in the way that the
executive and legislative branches of government are united. But
the choice of political systems does not adequately explain the no-
ticeably stronger position of Australian states vis i vis their federal
government as compared with American states and the U.S. govern-
ment. One obvious reason for this difference is the smaller number
of Australian states. With only six states35 and two territories,3 6 the
political power of any single state, especially a more heavily popu-
31. Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.I, at 5.
32. Among other sources, Professor Fowler cites a statement of the Prime Minister in 1989
that "[u]nder the Australian Constitution, the States and the Territories have the primary
authority for protecting and regulating the environment." Fowler, supra note 20, at 16-17.
Fowler nonetheless maintains that "the overall effect of recent interpretation of the constitu-
tion is to rebut the traditional view that the States have the primary authority for environ-
mental protection." Id. at 28.
33. FNAL REPORT OF THE CONSTrUTnON COMM'N 757-760 (1988) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
34. In suggesting clear constitutional authority for federal action on environmental mat-
ters, Fowler finds support in the traditional view that the states have the primary responsibil-
ity for environmental protection. Fowler, supra note 20, at 28.
35. New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western
Australia.
36. Australian Capitol Territory, Northern Territory.
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lated state like New South Wales, is bound to be much greater than
an American state. Moreover, the transaction costs of organizing a
majority of states to promote a particular outcome are far less in
Australia than in the United States.
Another factor which contributes to a weaker federal government
in Australia is a less prominent role in international affairs than has
traditionally been borne by the United States. While a nation's re-
sponsibilities in the international arena do not directly affect the
management of domestic problems, a stronger international pres-
ence undoubtedly promotes a sense of nationalism and a stronger
affiliation between citizens and their country. Finally, Australia
does not seem to have experienced a political transformation like
that occasioned by Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal in the 1930s.
Although the New Deal had little to do with environmental protec-
tion, it fostered a political climate in which federal control over the
nation's environmental problems became not merely acceptable,
but expected. It is these differences in our political histories, then,
that perhaps best explain the strong federal role in the EIA process
in the United States and the relatively weak role of the Australian
government in its EIA process.
C. Administrative Law and Judicial Process
Even if Australia and the United States had adopted identical
laws, significant differences in their respective judicial and adminis-
trative law systems would, most likely, have assured that their EIA
policies would mature differently. The most obvious differences
concern access to the court system to challenge agency action, dif-
ferences in rule-making processes, and different processes for judi-
cial review of agency action. Less obvious but perhaps equally
important are cultural differences which affect popular attitudes to-
wards government officials.
A variety of factors affect access to courts, including, most impor-
tantly, the right of an individual or organization to sue and the fi-
nancial risks involved in filing suit. In Australia, these two factors
operate to limit access; in the United States, they tend to promote
access.
1. Standing to Sue
In the United States, the right of private citizens and non-govern-
mental organizations to challenge agency action is a basic precept
of administrative law and was confirmed in the Administrative Pro-
Environmental Impact Assessment in Australia
cedure Act of 1946 ("APA"): 3 7 "A person suffering legal wrong, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the mean-
ing of a relevant statute is entitled to judicial relief thereof."
38
Australian law appears to afford a similar guarantee. Under the
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 ("ADJR"), 39
any person who is aggrieved 40 by an agency decision to which the
Act applies may seek judicial review in the Federal Court.41 By its
term, the ADJR Act applies to "a decision of an administrative char-
acter made, proposed to be made, or required to be made ...
under an enactment, other than a decision by the Governor Gen-
eral or a decision included in any of the classes of decisions set out
in Schedule 1."42 Schedule 1 is primarily concerned with decisions
relating to foreign affairs and taxes and does not include any deci-
sions which might be characterized as relating to protection of the
environment. Thus, the ADJR Act appears to apply to virtually any
decision by an agency relating to the environment, including a de-
cision to require or not require preparation of an EIS under the
terms of the Impact Act. The scope of persons who should be con-
sidered aggrieved within the meaning of the law, however, is not
clear on its face, and it is here where the essential differences be-
tween the Australian and American systems begin to emerge.
For example, since at least 1970, it has been clear that the right
to sue guaranteed by the American APA encompasses harm to envi-
ronmental or aesthetic interests. 43 No similar assurance exists in
37. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305,
3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1988)).
38. Id. § 702.
39. No. 59, 1977 Austl. Acts 314 (1977).
40. The scope of the phrase "a person aggrieved" is defined in section 3(4) of the ADJR
Act to encompass
(i) a person whose interests are adversely affected by the decision; or (ii) in the case of a
decision by way of a report or recommendation to a person whose interests would be
adversely affected if a decision were, or were not, made in accordance with the report or
recommendation [.]
41. The Federal Court in Australia was established pursuant to the Federal Court of Aus-
tralia Act 1976, No. 156, 1976 Austl. Acts 1323 (1976), solely to hear appeals from federal
tribunals. Itsjurisdiction was greatly expanded as a result of section 8 of the ADJR Act, which
vests the Federal Court with jurisdiction to hear all claims under the Act. Section 39B(1) of
the Judiciary Act 1903, No. 6, 1903 Austl. Acts 8 (1903), further makes clear that the Federal
Court of Australia has original jurisdiction over cases calling for a writ of mandamus or prohi-
bition or injunction against an officer of the Commonwealth.
42. ADJR Act § 3(1).
43. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In both of these cases, the
Court held that "the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many
1995]
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Australia. Indeed, the contrary appears to be true. In Australian
Conservation Found., Inc. v. Commonwealth,44 the High Court denied
the plaintiff organization the right to challenge both the govern-
ment's and a private company's compliance with the Impact Act
because the organization was unable to show any special damage to
itself.
To be sure, the showing made by the Australian Conservation
Foundation ("ACF") would not have satisfied even the less stringent
standards of American courts. The ACF apparently claimed the
right to sue on two grounds - first, its background and reputation
in environmental matters and, second, because it had submitted
comments on a draft EIS. The first of these grounds was the same
basic argument that the Sierra Club made unsuccessfully to the U.S.
Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton.45 However, in the United
States, it is generally accepted that the APA guarantees organiza-
tions like the Australian Conservation Foundation standing on be-
half of its members to challenge a faulty environmental impact
statement or other failure to comply with NEPA.46 Indeed, in Sierra
Club, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that the Sierra Club could
demonstrate its standing to sue merely by showing that one or more
of its members had aesthetic interests in the lands which they
sought to protect. Moreover, in the United States "the fact that par-
ticular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than
the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection
through the judicial process."47 Although recent decisions from
the U.S. Supreme Court suggest that the rules of access are tighten-
rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judi-
cial process." Cf Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); KENNETH DAVIS, ADMINISTRATwE LAW
TRATiSE §§ 24:27-34 (1994). Moreover, in the SCRAP case, the Court suggested that the
amount of injury suffered was unimportant. A "mere trifle" is apparently enough. United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689 n.14.
44. 146 C.L.RI 493 (Austl. 1980).
45. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
46. The right of an organization to sue on behalf of its membership was affirmed in
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963); a three-part test for organizational standard was
subsequently announced in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S.
333, 343 (1977). The right to raise procedural challenges under NEPA has been expressly
recognized in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2143 n.7 (1992).
47. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 734. To be sure, the Supreme Court has not been
entirely consistent about this issue. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), the Court held
that "when the asserted harm is a 'generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal mea-
sure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of
jurisdiction." 422 U.S. at 499. See also DAvis, supra note 43, § 24:34, for an analysis of ten
propositions advanced in Warth which Professor Davis claims are inconsistent with other
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ing,48 the basic standing principles articulated by the Court in the
Sierra Club decision remain the foundation of American standing
law.
By contrast, Australian Conservation Foundation, Inc. v. Common-
wealth appears to deny standing to a person unless he can show that
he is "more particularly affected than other people."49 Indeed, ac-
cording to the High Court, the ACF would not have standing to sue
even if it could show that certain members had standing in their
own right because "a corporation does not acquire standing be-
cause some of its members possess it."50 Even assuming that a per-
son could overcome these significant barriers to standing, access to
challenge a decision under the Impact Act might still be denied
since the High Court found that, with the possible exception of sec-
tion 10,51 the Act conferred no private rights to enforce the law.52
This holding is particularly remarkable since it appears to fly in the
Supreme Court decisions. In his most recent edition of his administrative law treatise, Profes-
sor Davis describes the Supreme Court decisions on standing since 1983. Id. §§ 24:1-1, 24:15.
48. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
49. Australian Conservation Found., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 146 C.L.R. 493, 527-28 (Austl.
1980) (quoting Anderson v. Commonwealth, 47 C.LR. 50, 51-52 (1932)). Contrary to the
decision in Sierra Club, more recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have also backed
away from the finding that rights held in common with other members of the public can
form the basis for standing. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), is, in fact, consistent with zoning laws. Professor Davis
has criticized the Supreme Court for its lack of consistency regarding this and other aspects
of standing law. See DAvis, supra note 43, §§ 24:27-34.
50. Australian Conservation Found., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 146 C.L.R. at 531 (citations
omitted). This view is contrary to the expressed views of the U.S. Supreme Court, which has
held that an organization can sue on behalf of its members so long as "(a) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of the individual members in the lawsuit." Hunt v.
Washington Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
51. Section 10 allows any person to request a written statement from the Minister regard-
ing actions that will be taken to ensure consideration of the environmental impacts of a
project. Impact Act § 10.
52. The High Court has said that
It is clear that the provisions of the Act, with the possible exception of [§J 10, do not
create private rights.... In other words, the Act does not expressly create any rights, and
the duty which it casts upon each Minister of State is one which is to be performed by
him in the course of administering the affairs of his department. That is a public duty,
and it is not owed to any particular person or persons.
Australian Conservation Found., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 146 C.L.R. at 524 (Gibbs, J.).
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face of the broad right of access to the Federal Court guaranteed by
the ADJR Act.53
A subsequent decision in the Federal Court of Australia, which
also involved the ACF, suggests a much broader test for standing
and may evince an emerging law of standing in Australia. In Austra-
lian Conservation Found., Inc. v. Minister for Resources,54 the ACF and a
private individual, Michael Harewood, challenged a decision by the
Minister of Resources to grant an export license for wood chips to
be produced through logging activities on National Estate lands in
two South East Forests. The ACF's substantive complaint con-
cerned the agency's alleged failure to comply with section 30 of the
Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975,55 which prohibited any
Minister from taking actions that would adversely affect the Na-
tional Estate unless there was "no feasible and prudent alterna-
tive." 56 Judge Davies, speaking for the Federal court, distinguished
the High Court's 1980 standing decision in Australian Conservation
Foundation, Inc. v. Commonwealth and, in the process, offered a more
liberal test for standing. According to the court, the ACF should be
accorded standing to sue because: (1) the case involved "one of the
major environmental issues of the present time"; (2) the public per-
ception of the need for organizations like the ACF to protect the
public interest had increased; and (3) the ACF was "not just a busy-
body" but had established itself as "preeminently the body con-
cerned with [the South East forest]." 57 By contrast, Michael
Harewood, who alleged that he had personally suffered damage to
the windshields on his motor vehicles from logging trucks, that he
was personally disturbed by the noise from the loading of chip
boats at night, and that he was personally upset by the loss of trees
and the destruction of plant and animal habitat as a result of log-
53. While the federal courts in Australia have been miserly in granting citizens access to
the courts, the legislature of New South Wales has taken the lead in allowing very broad
rights of access to courts. Section 123 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act
1979 allows "[a ] ny person" to "bring proceedings in the [Land and Environment] Court for
an order to remedy or restrain a breach of the Act, whether or not any right of that person
has been or may be infringed by or as a consequence of that breach." Environmental Plan-
ning and Assessment Act, 1979 N.S.W. Stat. No. 203, § 123 (1979). This provision allows
access far beyond that currently allowed under the American system, since it does not require
a showing of a personal interest in the matter at issue.
54. 19 Admin. L. Decisions 70 (Austl. Fed. Ct. 1989).
55. No. 57, 1975 Austl. Acts 599 (1975).
56. Id. § 30.
57. Australian Conservation Found., Inc. v. Minister for Resources, 19 Admin. L. Decisions
at 73-74.
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ging, was denied standing. Surprisingly, the court denied
Harewood standing because "[his] interest in the National Estate
[was] little more than that of any ordinary member of the
community."
58
As suggested above, the holding of the Federal Court is wholly
contrary to the law of standing as it has developed in the United
States - for a federal court in the United States would have, most
likely, denied standing to the ACF unless it could demonstrate a
personal injury to one of its members; by contrast, Harewood
plainly would have been granted standing in a U.S. court since he
alleged to have suffered specific, personal injuries that might be
redressed by a favorable ruling on the merits.
While the standards to be applied in granting organizational
standing in Australia ought to be more clearly articulated, the ap-
proach taken by the Australian Federal Court in Australian Conserva-
tion Foundation, Inc. v. Minister for Resources seems far preferable to
American standing law. As standing law has evolved in the United
States, individual plaintiffs and members of plaintiff organizations
are frequently forced to make elaborate demonstrations of their in-
terests in order to support their claim of standing. 59 While there is
no question that these individuals often have interests that should
be recognized by the court, in most cases, the real interest lies with
the organization that is representing the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court's holding in Sierra Club that "a mere 'interest in a problem,'
no matter how longstanding... is not sufficient [to give the organi-
zation standing]"60 has unnecessarily increased the complexity and
cost of litigation over issues that almost all agree are legitimate
questions for judicial resolution.61
58. Id. at 75. For a thorough review of Australian standing law, see Margaret Allars, Stand-
ing: The Role and Evolution of the Test, 20 FED. L. REv. 83 (1991) (Austl.).
59. See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (requiring plaintiff to allege
(1) an affected interest falling within the "zone of interests" the statute was enacted to pro-
tect, and (2) sufficient harm that will result from the proposed action).
60. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
61. American standing law is further complicated by the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the "Cases" and "Controversies" limitations contained in Article III, § 2 of the U.S. Consti-
tution. This language has been construed to impose three constitutional requirements for
standing:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" - an invasion of a legally-pro-
tected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) "actual or imminent,
not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical'". . . Second, there must be a causal connection be-
tween the injury and the conduct complained of ... Third, it must be "likely," as op-
posed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
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2. Costs and Legal Fees
The Administrative Procedure Act and the U.S. Supreme Court's
generous conferral of standing for injury to aesthetic interests
opened the court room doors to environmental plaintiffs. But the
plethora of environmental litigation that has materialized in the
United States would not likely have occurred if the plaintiffs faced
any significant risk of incurring substantial costs in bringing these
proceedings.
Australia follows the English rule that costs and legal fees are gen-
erally assessed against the losing party. From its earliest history,
however, American courts have rejected the English rule and re-
quired each party to bear its own legal fees.62 As a result, even as-
suming that a person can overcome the formidable obstacles
presented by the Australian courts' access rules, the financial risk
that the plaintiff might have to bear defendant's costs and legal fees
has deterred all but the most committed plaintiffs.
While not part of the National Environmental Policy Act, many
American environmental statutes include 'one-way fee shifting' pro-
visions which provide for the award of costs and attorneys' fees to
plaintiffs when they win but deny defendants this same right when
plaintiffs lose.63 Moreover, most American courts will award a pre-
liminary injunction against agency action, while requiring only a
nominal bond or, in some cases, no bond at all from the plaintiff.
64
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (citations omitted). The Court
conceded, however, that with respect to procedural rights, which would include for example
the right to ensure compliance with environmental impact act standards, the requirements of
"redressability and immediacy" do not have to be met. Id. at 2143 n.7.
62. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. The Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). However,
costs, except for legal fees, may be apportioned against the losing party. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(d).
63. This concept is based upon a theory that when private citizens seek to enforce federal
law, they are acting as a "private attorney general" vindicating important public interests.
One-way fee shifting is deemed an appropriate mechanism for promoting such actions.
Although NEPA does not contain any one-way fee shifting provision, costs and legal fees are
often available to a winning plaintiff, subject to some limitations, under the Equal Access to
Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980).
64. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Brinegar, 518 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1975) (re-
versing the district court decision imposing a $4.5 million bond in a NEPA case and reducing
the bond to $1,000); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that no bond
was required in NEPA case, and that a court has discretion to decide whether to impose a
bond); Morgan v. Walter, 728 F. Supp. 1483, 1494 (D. Idaho 1989) (holding that no bond
was required in a NEPA case because "imposition of a bond upon [environmental] plaintiffs
would be unreasonable and tantamount to denying them access to judicial review in this
matter."); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D.D.C.
1971) ("The requirement of more than a nominal amount as security would in the Court's
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Thus, the risk to the plaintiff in filing a lawsuit is minimal. This
difference in financial risks between American and Australian
courts is the single most important factor in explaining the relative
dearth of environmental litigation in Australia.
Even as American courts have begun tightening access, there are
signs that the prospects for environmental plaintiffs in Australia
may be brightening. In addition to recognizing broader standing,
some Australian courts have begun to accept that costs should not
be awarded against losing plaintiffs in public interest environmen-
tal cases. 65 However, contrary decisions remain good law. 66 Until
public interest plaintiffs have some confidence that they will not
face these costs, litigation in Australia to protect environmental
amenities will likely remain uncommon.
67
opinion stifle the intent of [NEPA], since these three 'concerned private organizations'
would be precluded from obtaining judicial review of the defendant's actions.").
65. See BRIAN J. PRESTON, ENVIRONMENTAL LrrIGAION 329-334 (1989); see also Margaret Al-
lars, Standing: The Role and Evolution of the Test, 20 FED. L. Rav. 83, 107-108 (1991).
66. See, e.g., Australian Conservation Found., Inc. v. Forestry Comm'n of Tasmania, 76
A.L.G.R. 381 (Fed. Ct. 1988). In awarding costs against the unsuccessful plaintiffs the court
held that
If a body is set up to pursue causes, which its founders consider to be in the public
interest, and which generally may be in the public interest, by means including court
proceedings against others, it does not follow that those proceeded against should be
deprived of the ordinary protection of a right to an order in respect of their costs in the
event the claims made against them prove unfounded.
Id. at 386.
67. Indeed, the risk of having to pay costs continues to have a significant deterrent effect
on litigation. In Brown v. Environmental Protection Authority (November 12, 1992) (Pearl-
man, C.J.) (unreported decision of the Land & Environment Court reviewed by the author),
Brown claimed that the Australian EPA's decision to license a paper mill was made without
compliance with the EIA requirements of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act.
Brown also claimed various violations of the New South Wales Pollution Control Act.
Brown's allegations are described in greater detail in a preliminary decision from the Land &
Environment Court by Justice Stein, which granted Brown leave of the court to bring pro-
ceedings against the New South Wales Environment Protection Authority and North Broken
Hill, Ltd., the owner of the paper mill. Brown v. Environmental Protection Agency, 75
A.L.G.R. 397 (N.S.W. Land & Env't Ct. 1992). The Land & Environment Court ruled against
Brown on all counts. While an appeal was pending, the New South Wales Parliament quickly
passed an amendment to the Pollution Control Act that essentially eviscerated Brown's EIA
claim. Although Brown's remaining claims were still viable, the defendants agreed that they
would not seek costs against Brown, if he would drop the appeal. On the advice of counsel,
Brown agreed. A.J. Brown, Comments at the Australian Centre for Environmental Law Semi-
nar, Australian National University (August 9th, 1993).
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 20:43
3. Rule-making Proceedings
In the United States, the informal rule-making provisions of the
APA68 have imposed strict procedural requirements on federal
agencies for the promulgation of federal rules. These include prior
notice of a proposed rule and an opportunity for public com-
ment.69 Rules adopted under these procedures have the force of
law and are often the basis for legal action against federal agencies.
Moreover, American agencies cannot, generally, choose to promul-
gate non-binding guidelines on matters which may affect individual
rights. 70 Detailed rules implementing NEPA were first promul-
gated in 1978.71 These rules form the core of federal agency re-
sponsibilities under NEPA.
Rule-making processes in Australia are less clearly defined.
Moreover, in contrast to the American experience, "rule-making"
appears to have played a much less significant role in the develop-
ment of Australian administrative law.72 To be sure, Australia has
had a process for promulgating "statutory rules" since at least
1903, 73 and many rules have been promulgated under this author-
68. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
69. Id. Indeed, federal rule-making proceedings are themselves subject to environmental
impact assessment requirements under NEPA. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (1994) ("Actions
include . . . new or revised agency rules, 'regulations, plans, policies or procedures[.]").
70. As the Supreme Court has noted, "The Administrative Procedure Act was adopted to
provide, inter alia, that administrative policies affecting individual rights and obligations be
promulgated pursuant to certain stated procedures so as to avoid the inherently arbitrary
nature of unpublished ad hoc determinations." Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974).
See also Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the Department of
Labor must comply with such APA requirements as notice and public comment when deter-
mining unemployment rates, an action which affected job allocations).
71. 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1994). The rules were promulgated pursuant to Exec. Order No.
11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4,247 (1970), amended by Exec. Order No. 11,991, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,967
(1977).
72. It would likely surprise many American lawyers, for example, to learn that the standard
administrative law text in Australia makes no mention of rules or regulations in either its
index or the table of contents. See E.I. SYKEs ET AL., GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISrRATIVE
LAw (3d ed. 1989).
73. Rules Publication Act 1903, No. 18, 1903 Austl. Acts 105 (1903). In addition, under
section 48(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901-1973, No. 1, 1974 Austl. Acts 75 (1974), all
regulations must be "notified in the Gazette," and "laid before each House of the Parliament
within 15 sitting days of that House after the making of the regulations." The Act further
provides authority for either House of Parliament to "disallow" the regulation within 15 sit-
ting days after they have been laid before the House. Id. § 48(4), (5). A standing committee
of the Parliament generally reviews all such rules for consistency with the authorizing legisla-
tion, and advises the Parliament on whether such rules should be disallowed. The legislative
veto procedure established by the Acts Interpretation Act would likely be found unconstitu-
tional in the United States as contrary to the separation of powers doctrine. See, e.g., Immi-
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ity. But most agencies have also adopted internal policies and
"rules" to govern their day-to-day operations. While these internal
procedures must be published and made available to the public, as
in America,74 they do not have the status of "statutory rules," and
they, arguably, cannot be enforced by a private party against the
agency.
75
The distinction between statutory rules and less formal orders or
procedures reflects a fundamental difference between the Austra-
lian and American approaches toward rule-making. As noted
above, statutory rules are subject to the review and disapproval of
Parliament. In this sense, they are closer to legislation. Indeed,
gration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). This result flows from the
more distinct separation between the executive and legislative branches of government in the
United States, than exists in Australia.
74. The U.S. Freedom of Information Act provides in relevant part:
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for
the guidance of the public-
(A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the established places at
which, the employees (and in the case of a uniformed service, the members)
from whom, and the methods whereby, the public may obtain information, make
submittals or requests, or obtain decisions;
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions are chan-
neled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal and
informal procedures available;
(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the places at which
forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and contents of all pa-
pers, reports, or examinations;
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and
statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated
and adopted by the agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof, a
person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a
matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published. For the
purpose of this paragraph, matter reasonably available to the class of persons affected
thereby is deemed published in the Federal Register when incorporated by reference
therein with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1) (1988). See also MARK ARONSON & NICOLA FRAANKIN, REvrEw OF ADMrNIs-
TRATrVE ACTION 41-43 (1987).
75. It might be argued, however, that an agency failed to consider a relevant factor as
required by ADJR § 5(2) (b), where it chooses to ignore an internal procedure. Cf Nikac v.
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, 16 Admin. L. Decisions 611
(Fed. Ct. 1988). The Administrative Review Council of Australia (the counterpart to the
Administrative Conference of the United States) has recently begun to examine the desirabil-
ity of establishing informal rule-making processes in Australia. See, e.g., Bert Mowbray & Ste-
phen Bourke, Rule-Making in Commonwealth Agencies, 66 CANBERRA BULL. PUB. ADMIN. 150
(1991).
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Australian law characterizes such rules as subordinate or delegated
legislation. The less formal orders and procedures are more akin
to American rules in the sense that they are truly administrative in
character. They too, however, are different from American rules,
since they are subject to less stringent promulgation, review, and
enforcement.
In addition to the general authority under the Statutory Rules
Publication Act 1903, substantive legislation often includes a dele-
gation of specific authority to promulgate schedules, guidelines, or-
ders, or regulations. The Impact Act contains typical language.
Under section 6 of the Act, the Governor General is authorized to
issue "orders" establishing administrative procedures under the
Act. 76 Notice of the order must be published in the Gazette77 and
laid before each House of Parliament within 15 days after it is
made. Either House of Parliament may then pass a resolution
within 15 days disallowing all or part of any such order, whereupon
it ceases to have effect.78 Section 6 procedures for implementing
the Impact Act were first issued in June 1975 and were substantially
revised in 1987.
Significantly, the Impact Act also authorizes the Governor Gen-
eral to promulgate "regulations ... prescribing all matters that are
required or permitted by this Act... or are necessary or convenient
• ..for carrying out or giving effect to this Act."79 These must be
scrutinized by the Regulations and Ordinances Committee of the
Parliament. The only regulations promulgated under the Impact
Act to date concern witness fees for inquiry proceedings. 80
Although the distinction between "regulations" issued under sec-
tion 25 and "orders" under section 6 is not entirely free of doubt, it
appears that the Parliament intended that the regulations be
treated as binding on the agency, whereas orders could be treated
merely as guidelines for agency decisions.8 ' Thus, by publishing
76. Impact Act § 6.
77. Id. § 7. The Gazette is the equivalent of the Federal Register in the United States.
78. 1I Legislative veto authority over agency rules has been found to be an unconstitu-
tional infringement on executive power in the United States. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
79. Impact Act § 25.
80. No. 85, 1975 Stat. Rules 478 (1975); No. 31, 1990 Stat. Rules 103 (1990).
81. In describing the administrative procedures promulgated under § 6 of the Impact Act,
Justice Gibbs noted that
The Administrative Procedures are exactly what their name suggests - rules which lay
down the procedure to be followed by persons seeking, considering or taking adminis-
trative action. They are not declared by the Act to have the force of law; on the contrary,
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the key procedures as "orders," the Minister for the Environment
may have intended to avoid a claim that they are enforceable in
Court. Indeed, the history of the Impact Act suggests that the gov-
ernment was wary of inviting litigation, and the establishment of
unenforceable orders would be consistent with this concern. 82
Thus far, no court has been asked to enforce the terms of a Com-
monwealth order issued under the Impact Act.85 While the High
Court has suggested that the only private right created under the
Impact Act was that in section 10 of the act,8 4 the authority to en-
force the terms of the Act and its section 6 procedures under laws
such as the Administrative Decisions Judicial Review Act remains an
open question.
The lack of coherence in Australia's current rule-making
processes has recently drawn the attention of the Australian Admin-
istrative Review Council which has recommended substantial
changes to the system for rule-making in Australia.85 If adopted,
the proposed changes would make Australia's system for rule-mak-
ing much more like the system which operates in the United States.
In particular, the Council has recommended that the Parliament
enact a new statute - The Legislative Instruments Act - which
would, among other things, provide for: (1) broad application of
the statute to "any delegated instrument which is legislative in char-
acter"; (2) mandatory consultation with the community prior to
they must be "consistent with relevant laws" (s.6), and in this respect they differ from
regulations which, according to s. 9, "have effect notwithstanding any other law." More-
over, the Minister is not bound absolutely to see that the procedures are observed.
Australian Conservation Found., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 146 C.L.R. 493, 524 (Austl. 1980)
See also BATES, supra note 5, at 96.
82. See BATES, supra note 5, at 111-12.
83. Note that in the United States, the fact that Congress or the agency may have intended
that certain rules be unenforceable would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that they
should not be enforced. On the contrary, "[w] here the rights of individuals are affected, it is
incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so even where the internal
procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required." Morton v. Ruiz,
415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (citing Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957)).
84. Australian Conservation Found., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 146 C.L.R. 493, 524 (Austl.
1980) ("It is clear that the provisions of the Act, with the possible exception of s. 10, do not
create private rights."). See also i&. at 526. Section 10 authorizes any person to request writ-
ten information from the Minister for the Environment "as to what action, if any, has been
taken . .. for ensuring consideration of the environmental aspects" of a proposed project.
Impact Act § 10.
85. ADMIN. REV. COUNCIL, RFP No. 35, RULE MAKING By COMMONwEALTH AGENCIES (1992).
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making new rules; and (3) the establishment of a Legislative Instru-
ments Register for publication of statutory rules.
86
4. Administrative Review
Processes for administrative appeals of agency action are com-
monplace in the United States, although the procedures vary
greatly among agencies. The nature of these processes can, per-
haps, best be understood by briefly reviewing the appeal proce-
dures for the two chief federal land management agencies - the
Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") and the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice.8 7 Each of these agencies is involved in the preparation of
many EIA documents every year.
88
In accordance with federal regulations, the final decisions of the
chief BLM officers are subject to appellate review by the quasi-in-
dependent Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA").89 Typically,
an interested person files an appeal from an agency decision di-
rectly with the IBLA, although the Board may remand the case to
an administrative law judge for a fact-finding hearing if necessary.
Such appeals may, and frequently do, include challenges to the
agency's compliance with EIA requirements. The Board has the au-
thority to order oral argument, but, generally, it reviews cases solely
on written briefs filed by the various parties in accordance with a
strict time table. The process tends to be somewhat formal, and the
86. See id. at Recommendation 8 (regarding the recommended scope of the Legislative
Instruments Act), Recommendations 9-12 (regarding procedures for public consultation),
and Recommendations 24-29 (regarding the Legislative Instruments Register).
87. The Bureau of Land Management is an agency within the United States Department of
the Interior; the United States Forest Service is an agency within the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture. See OnCE OF THE FED. REGISTER, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL
1994/1995 (1994).
88. Because these two agencies manage approximately one third of the land resources in
the United States, and because those lands are the source of many conflicts between private
development and public use, the Forest Service and the BLM are responsible for a substantial
percentage of the Environmental Impact Statement documents prepared in the United
States. See 22 COUNCIL ENVTL. QUAIry ANN. REP. 148-150, 311 (1992).
89. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.400-4.478 (1994). The IBLA is one of several Boards under the di-
rection of the Department's Office of Hearings and Appeals ("OHA"). OHA is under the
direction of the second highest ranking official at the Department, the Undersecretary of the
Interior. Thus, while both the BLM and the IBLA are agencies with the Department of the
Interior, their separate chains of authority meet only at the top level of the Department. This
has generally allowed the IBLA sufficient distance from the BLM to serve as an independent
review body.
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briefs are prepared by lawyers for the opposing sides.90 Most Board
members are lawyers. Furthermore, a staff of lawyers and law clerks
is available to assist the Board members, called Administrative
Judges, in preparing their decisions. Following briefing, the Board
issues a written decision. This decision becomes binding precedent
for the BLM unless it is subsequently overturned by an order of the
Secretary.91 This occurs rarely. Since the Board's decision sets De-
partment policy, the BLM cannot seek judicial review of an adverse
Board decision. Its sole recourse is to seek reversal by the Secretary.
By contrast, private parties may appeal adverse decisions to an ap-
propriate federal district court.
The U.S. Forest Service has a less formal appeal process than the
BLM.92 Under the Forest Service rules, an interested person may
appeal any decision of one line officer to the next level line officer
merely by filing a notice of appeal together with a statement of rea-
sons for the appeal.93 In some cases, as, for example, when the
initial decision is made by a low level line officer, second level ap-
peals are also -allowed. This less formal appeals process lends itself
to greater citizen involvement in filing appeals. Often these ap-
peals raise policy rather than legal issues, though the focus of most
of the significant appeals remains legal. Unlike the process at the
Department of the Interior, the Forest Service appeals process
makes no pretense of separating the decision-making from appel-
late review functions, and the agency has been criticized for this.9
4
Nonetheless, in large part because of the great controversy in the
United States over logging activities, the Forest Service has, in re-
90. The agency's rules require representation by an attorney in most cases. The major
exception is for persons representing themselves or an organization for which they are an
officer or employee. 43 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1994).
91. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.403 (1994).
92. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 217.1-217.19 (1994).
93. The U.S. Forest Service regulations define a "Forest Service line officer" as
a Forest Service official who serves in a direct line of command from the Chief and who
has the delegated authority to make and execute decisions subject to this part. Specifi-
cally for the purposes of this part, a Forest Service employee who holds one of the follow-
ing offices and tides: District Ranger, Deputy Forest Supervisor, Forest Supervisor,
Deputy Regional Forester, Regional Forester, Associate Deputy Chief, Deputy Chief, As-
sociate Chief of the Forest Service or an employee delegated the authority to act in one
of these capacities.
36 C.F.R. § 215.2 (1994). See also 36 C.F.R. § 217.2 (1994).
94. See, e.g., Mark Squillace, Administrative Review of U.S. Forest Service Decisions, (May
22, 1992) (paper presented at Administrative Appeals and Judicial Review Conference, ABA
Section on Natural Resources, Energy and Environmental Law, Denver, CO) (on file with the
author).
1995]
64 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 20:43
cent years, been so deluged with appeals that it proposed aban-
doning its appeals process altogether. The only recourse to
aggrieved parties would then have been the courts. After a public
outcry, and after the Forest Service received more than 10,000 com-
ments on its proposal to abandon the appeals process, Congress
intervened, and the agency retained its appeals process, albeit with
changes that are intended to eliminate frivolous appeals. 95
The Forest Service appeals process has served a useful role in ed-
ucating the agency about defects in their planning and EIA
processes as well as more general public concerns regarding the
management of forest resources. It has, for example, been an im-
portant vehicle for promoting the need to (1) protect the biodivers-
ity9 6 of forest resources, (2) manage the forest for the protection of
ecosystems, and (3) consider the cumulative impacts of all past,
present and reasonably foreseeable future actions. The lack of im-
partiality remains a serious flaw with the appeals process and, argua-
bly, results in the denial of many meritorious appeals. However,
the process of forcing agency officials to review their actions in light
of a threat of further legal action has gradually transformed the way
in which the agency carries out its work.
9 7
Since 1975, administrative appeals from federal agency decisions
in Australia have largely been limited to actions subject to review
under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975.98 This law
provides for a right to administrative review before an administra-
tive appeals tribunal ("AAT") from certain kinds of administrative
decisions as provided at section 25 of the Act.99
95. See The Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 102-381, § 322, 106 Stat. 1374, 1419 (1992) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1612
(Supp. V 1993)).
96. Recently, the United States Council on Environmental Quality has published guidance
for agencies on this issue. COUNCIL ENvTL. QuALrrv, INCORPORATING BIODIVERSITY CONSIDERA-
TIONS INTO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Act (1993).
97. See Squillace, supra note 94, at 3.
98. No. 91, 1975 Austl. Acts 869 (1975). Victoria is the only Australian state with a similar
AAT process. See ARONSON & FRANKLIN, supra note 74, at ch. 10. Internal review of agency
actions is occasionally required by Statute, but these provisions are the exception rather than
the rule. SeeJulian Disney, Preliminary Paper on Administrative Review of Commonwealth
Environmental Decisions 7 (Dec. 1992) (unpublished manuscript on file at the Centre for
International and Public Law, The Australian National University).
99. Section 25(4) of the AAT Act, supra note 98, grants the tribunal the "power to review
any decision in respect of which application is made to it under any enactment." "Enact-
ment" in turn is defined broadly to include any Act or Ordinance of a territory (not includ-
ing Papua New Guinea), or an instrument made under an Act or Ordinance. Id. § 3(1). The
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The AAT currently has jurisdiction over more than 300 federal
statutes in such diverse areas as social security, taxation, freedom of
information, and employment compensation. It also has jurisdic-
tion over matters under some environmental laws, including, for
example, the Lands Acquisition Act and the Industrial Chemicals
Act. Significant barriers to review, however, have been imposed
under some of these laws. For example, standing to seek review
before the AAT is limited under the Lands Acquisition Act, and re-
view of decisions under the Industrial Chemicals Act is limited to
decisions denying a permit.100 Thus, persons may not challenge de-
cisions to grant a permit before the AAT.10'
Moreover, administrative review over many environmental deci-
sions in Australia, such as those under the Impact Act, is simply not
available. 0 2 To be sure, there is no general provision for adminis-
trative review of agency decisions under NEPA in the United States.
Such review is available only in the context of the specific review
procedures available at particular administrative agencies, such as
those described with respect to the BLM and the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice. Furthermore, public land management in Australia is en-
trusted to the states, and, thus, the types of public land decisions
reviewed under the BLM and Forest Service administrative review
procedures are simply not made by the federal government in Aus-
tralia.10 3 Finally, nothing in the AAT process precludes review of an
agency's compliance with the Impact Act, if that issue arises in the
context of an otherwise appealable decision. The fact remains,
however, that the AAT has never been asked to address an issue
under the Impact Act. In light of the difficulties associated with
judicial review of environmental decisions in Australia, more con-
apparent intent of this provision is to extend the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to those "enact-
ments" which expressly provide for review by the Tribunal; i.e., those "in which the applica-
tion is made to it under [the express terms of] any enactment." Id. § 25(4). This provision
could also be construed, however, to grant the AAT universal jurisdiction over "any decision
... under any enactment." Id.
100. See Disney, supra note 98, at 7-8.
101. These limits on review of environmental matters help to explain why in 1990-91 only
four applications for review before the AAT were in the environmental category. Id. at 8.
102. The Administrative Review Council of Australia has recommended that the AAT's
jurisdiction be extended to encompass several federal laws including the Australian Heritage
Commission Act, the Biological Control Act and the Mining (Submerged Lands) Act. Thus
far these recommendations have not been adopted. Id. at 8.
103. Some Australian states, most notably Victoria, have made provision for administrative
review of some environmental decisions. Other states have established specialized courts or
review bodies to hear such disputes.
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sideration should be given to affording broader opportunities for
administrative review of government decisions which affect the
environment.
104
5. The Scope of Judicial Review
In both the United States and Australia, the scope of judicial re-
view of federal agency action is limited. Under Australia's ADJR
Act,105 a party aggrieved by any decisions to which the Act applies 106
may seek review in the Federal Court on a variety of procedural
grounds including, for example, that the decision was made (1) in
breach of the rules of "natural justice,"10 7 (2) by a person without
jurisdiction to make the decision, or (3) contrary to procedures re-
quired by law to be observed. 10 8 Substantive review is limited to
decisions which are "so unreasonable that no reasonable person
could have so exercised the power" 1°9 or to some other abuse of the
agency's discretionary power. Similar authority is granted to review
conduct related to making of decisions.110 When a person is ag-
grieved by an agency's failure to make a decision and when the
agency has an obligation to make such decision, the aggrieved per-
son may seek review on the grounds of unreasonable delay or on
the grounds of failure to comply with a statutory time limitation.' 1
Under the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act, the district courts
may review virtually any decision of an administrative agency' 1 2 ex-
104. The definition of "enactment" at section 3(1) of the AAT Act, coupled with the au-
thority granted under section 25 of the Act, would appear to allow the Commonwealth to
extend the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to Impact Act decisions, either by regulations promul-
gated pursuant to section 25 of the Impact Act, or even procedures adopted pursuant to
section 6 of the Impact Act.
105. No. 59, 1977 Austl. Acts 314 (1977).
106. Section 3(1) of the ADJR Act defines "decision to which this Act applies" to mean "a
decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made
... (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not) under an enactment, other than a deci-
sion by the Governor-General[.]" ADJR Act § 3. Note that since the Governor-General is the
officer responsible for making both "orders" (§ 6) and "regulations" (§ 25) under the Impact
Act, facial challenges to those rules under the ADJR Act would not be allowed. This is an
important distinction from the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act. It does seem, however,
that one might challenge an order or regulation as applied in a particular matter.
107. This would be called a violation of "due process" in the United States, as provided
under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
108. ADJR Act § 5(1). See aLsoJudiciary Act § 39B.
109. ADJR Act § 5(2) (g).
110. Id. § 6.
111. Id. § 7.
112. An "agency," as defined under the APA, excludes, among other things, the Congress
and the federal courts. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1988). The President has also been found to be
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cept in two circumstances: (1) when a "statute preclude[s] judicial
review," or (2) when "agency action is committed to agency discre-
tion by law." 113 These are narrow exceptions, and few agency deci-
sions are allowed to escape judicial scrutiny." 4 The scope of review
of agency decisions is quite similar to that accorded in Australia
under the ADJR Act. Under the APA, a court must "hold unlawful
and set aside" agency decisions found to be "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,"
"contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity," "in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right," or "without observance of procedure required by
law."115 This limited review authority has been reinforced by the
Supreme Court's deferential attitude toward agency decisions."
t 6
As a result of this narrow scope of review, most plaintiffs in the
United States who are challenging agency decisions based upon an
EIA process rely on claims that the agency failed to comply with the
procedures established under the statute or the detailed Council on
Environmental Quality regulations. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has frequently admonished plaintiffs that NEPA's mandate is "es-
exempt from APA review by the Supreme Court. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct, 2767,
2775 (1992) ("The President is not explicitly excluded from the APA's purview, but he is not
explicitly included, either. Out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique con-
stitutional position of the President, we find that textual silence is not enough to subject the
President to the provisions of the APA.").
113. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1988).
114. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) ("Simi-
larly, the Secretary's decision here does not fall within the exception for action 'committed
to agency discretion.' ... the legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates
that it is applicable in those rare instances were 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that
in a given case there is no law to apply.' S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945).").
115. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2) (A-D) (1988). In reviewing agency decisions, the reviewing court
must examine the "whole record" and "shall compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1988).
116. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984), rehg den., 468 U.S. 1227 (1984), which held that federal courts should defer
to an agency's interpretation of legislation which it is charged with administering if such
interpretation is based on a "permissible construction of the statute." The Supreme Court's
subsequent decision in Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421 (1987), however, suggests a less deferential standard where a case presents a "pure ques-
tion of statutory construction," or where an agency reversed a prior policy or interpretation.
Id. at 446. Although a few commentators question the continuing importance of the Chevron
doctrine, the degree of deference required by the Chevron decision remains the subject of
much scholarly debate. See, e.g., Timothy B. Dyk, The Supreme Court's Role in Not Shaping
Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 429 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, The D.C. Circuit: Here and
Now, 55 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 718 (1987); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron
Era, 3 YALEJ. ON REG. 283 (1986).
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sentially procedural,"' 1 7 and in no case has a federal court found an
agency decision to be arbitrary or capricious under NEPA." 8
While on paper the scope of judicial review of agency action ap-
pears to be similar in the United States and Australia in practice,
Australian courts seem less inclined than their American counter-
parts to overturn agency action. An interesting contrast between an
American and an Australian case helps to illustrate this point.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe' 9 is a leading case in the
field of U.S. administrative law. In this case, the U.S. Department
of Transportation had proposed to place a highway through Over-
ton Park, in Memphis, Tennessee. Under the applicable statute,
the Department was not authorized to use federal funds to finance
highway construction through a public park if a "feasible and pru-
dent alternative" route existed. The government argued that this
language afforded the Secretary wide discretion to consider a vari-
ety of factors, including the detriment to park lands in reaching a
decision. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed:
It is obvious that in most cases considerations of cost, directness
of route, and community disruption will indicate that parkland
should be used for highway construction whenever possible....
[T]here will always be a smaller outlay required from the public
purse when parkland is used since the public already owns the
land . . . And since people do not live or work in parks, if a
highway is built on parkland no one will have to leave his home
or give up his business .... [I]f Congress had intended these
factors to be on equal footing with preservation of parkland
there would have been no need for the statutes.
... But the very existence of the statutes indicates that protection
of parkland was to be given paramount importance. The few
green havens that are public parks were not to be lost unless
there were truly unusual factors present in a particular case... If
the statutes are to have any meaning, the Secretary cannot ap-
prove the destruction of parkland unless he finds that alternative
routes present unique problems.
12 0
117. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) ("NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation,
but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural.").
118. Still, the prospect remains that such a case may arise. In Baltimore Gas and Electric
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983), the Supreme Court held
that a decision of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would violate NEPA if the Commission
were found to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
119. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
120. Id. at 411-13.
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The decision in Overton Park stands in marked contrast to the de-
cision nearly 20 years later by the Federal Court of Australia in Aus-
tralian Conservation Found., Inc. v. Minister for Resources.121 This case
was previously noted because it contains what is perhaps the most
liberal ruling on environmental standing in any Australian federal
court opinion. On the merits, however, the court was far less gener-
ous. The case involved a decision by the Minister of Resources to
grant a 17-year wood chip export license to Harris-Daishowa for its
wood chip mill at Eden, New South Wales. The areas proposed for
logging were part of the national estate. In accordance with the
Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975,122 each Minister was
bound to avoid taking any action that adversely affects the national
estate "unless he is satisfied that there is no feasible and prudent
alternative... ."123 The company's own EIS had found that 78% of
one of the State Forests involved would be logged pursuant to the
license, and there was no dispute that the national estate would be
adversely affected. Still, the court upheld the action:
The question of what was a feasible and prudent alternative was a
matter of value judgment, and that judgment was reposed in this
case in the Minister.... It was open to and indeed necessary for
the Minister to take into account the economic interests of the
timber industry. It was relevant to take into account the views of
the New South Wales Government and the New South Wales For-
estry Commission. It was the Minister's satisfaction as to the
existence of any feasible and prudent alternative that
mattered.12 4
Remarkably, there was no evidence in the record to suggest that
the Minister had even considered the possibility of a feasible or pru-
dent alternative to logging. However, the court was not moved by
this observation, finding that the Minister's consideration of alter-
natives could be implied from the lack of evidence that he failed to
consider them:
[T]he evidence does not show that the Minister failed to con-
sider the issues raised by § 30(1) of the Act or misunderstood the
question that the AHC [Australian Heritage Commission] provi-
sion poses, or lacked the satisfaction which it specifies.
125
121. 19 Admin. L. Decisions 70 (Austl. Fed. Ct. 1989).
122. No. 57, 1975 Austl. Acts 599 (1975).
123. Australian Heritage Commission Act § 30(1).
124. Australian Conservation Found., Inc. v. Minister for Resources, 19 Admin. L. Deci-
sions at 76.
125. Id. at 78.
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Borrowing from the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in Overton
Park, the Australian Federal Court might instead have observed that
there would have been no need for a statutory provision to protect
the national estate, if the Minister was simply supposed to consider
the impacts on that estate along with every other relevant factor.
Thus, section 30(1) of the Australian Heritage Commission Act
must have been enacted to ensure that the national estate was af-
forded some higher level of importance than other factors which
might be relevant to the decision. The deference accorded the
Minister's decision by the Federal Court, however, effectively nulli-
fied the import of the statute.
Aside from the striking difference in the construction of the simi-
lar language regarding feasible and prudent alternatives, the U.S.
Supreme Court also spoke to the question of the adequacy of the
administrative record for an agency decision. In Overton Park, the
agency had failed to provide the court with the complete adminis-
trative record upon which the original decision had been made.
Instead, the government had relied on affidavits which had been
prepared to defend the litigation. The Court criticized such docu-
ments as "'post hoc' rationalizations" 126 and made clear thatjudicial
review must be based on the "full administrative record that was
before the Secretary at the time-he made his decision." 127 Since the
time of the Overton Park decision, U.S. agencies routinely provide
the courts with a complete administrative record as a basis for judi-
cial review, and review is generally limited to that record. 128 Per-
haps because of the dearth of litigation challenging agency
decisions, this practice has not taken hold in Australia. It is a prac-
tice, however, that seems indispensable to ensuring that agencies
are accountable for the decisions which they make.
6. Public Attitudes Toward Government
One distinction between American and Australian law which can-
not be traced to any law or procedure concerns public attitudes
toward government institutions. This may, nonetheless, have a
profound influence on the way that the respective laws and proce-
dures have evolved. A culture which harbors a greater level of dis-
126. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 419.
127. Id. at 420.
128. See also Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (hold-
ing that judicial review of agency action must be based solely on the reasons stated by the
agency at the time that it took the action).
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trust of its government, for example, may be more inclined to
challenge and, perhaps, repudiate its authority. The extent to
which these differences exist and may have affected the develop-
ment of EIA law is beyond the scope of this paper. It seems fair to
assume, however, that cultural differences may explain, at least in
part, some of the reasons that Australian and American EIA
processes have evolved differently.'
29
III. MAKING EIA WoRK
EIA's central purpose is to aid government agencies in deciding
whether to go forward with a proposed project or program and, if
so, in what manner and scope. If the decision is made to go for-
ward in some fashion, EIA is also helpful in guiding the agency to-
ward appropriate terms or conditions.
30
EIA is most effective in achieving these purposes if:
(1) The range of proposals that are covered by the EIA program
is broad but clearly defined.
(2) It occurs at a sufficiently early stage after a proposal has been
made to allow the completion of the EIA process before any per-
son or organization has made a substantial, irretrievable commit-
ment to a particular outcome.
(3) It provides the decision maker with sufficient information
about the environmental consequences of a proposed action and
all reasonable alternatives to that proposed action such that an
informed choice from among these alternatives can be made.
(4) It occurs in an atmosphere that is neutral towards any partic-
ular outcome.
(5) The interested public is afforded a reasonable opportunity
to participate in the process before a substantial commitment is
made to a particular outcome.
129. Some have suggested, for example, that Americans are by nature litigious, and dis-
trustful of government. Certainly there is more litigation in the United States than in Austra-
lia, even after accounting for the sizeable differences in population. But it is probably not
possible to know whether the legal institutions which promote more litigation in the United
States are a reflection of American culture, or rather whether the culture is a reflection of
American institutions.
130. So, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (1978) ("NEPA's purpose is not to generate paperwork
- even excellent paperwork - but to foster excellent action. The NEPA process is intended
to help public officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental
consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment.") See
also ITRacovER MENTAL AGREEMENT ON THE ENvioRNMENT § 3.4 (May, 1992) [hereinafter
IGAE] (on file with the author) ("[T]he parties agree that environmental considerations will
be integrated into Government decision-making processes at all levels by ... ensuring that
there is a proper examination of matters which significantly affect the environment.").
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(6) The decision-making body has established clear standards to
guide the decision well in advance of the time that the proposal
is presented for a decision.
(7) The decision-making body makes a reasonable choice from
among the alternatives (or some combination of the alternatives)
presented in the EIA document and based upon the established
guidelines.
(8) The decision is conditioned upon reasonable mitigation of
environmental impacts.
(9) Persons adversely affected by the decision are afforded an
opportunity to contest the decision either on the basis that the
established EIA process was not followed or that the decision was
not reasonable.
(10) It establishes a mechanism for auditing the accuracy of pre-
dictions made in the EIA process and for adjusting the decision
as appropriate to reflect actual experience.
This section evaluates the EIA process in the United States and Aus-
tralia in the context of each of these criteria.
13 1
A. The Range of Proposals Covered by EA
EIA - and its goal of promoting better decisions - can work
only if it is used. If government agencies believe in EIA - if they
believe that it will lead to better decisions - then it makes good
practical sense to use EIA wherever unresolved policy choices ex-
ist.15 2 Practical considerations, however, suggest that "the level of
detail [should be] commensurate with the significance of the issues
raised."135 In recognition of the differences in potential impacts
from proposed actions, the United States and some Australian juris-
131. These 10 criteria are synthesized from my experience and that of the many other
commentators on environmental impact assessments who are referred to throughout this
article.
132. By contrast, EIA might reasonably be avoided where it offers no benefit to the deci-
sion-maker. For example, where the government's action is ministerial in nature, and the
private activity cannot be affected by the agency's action, little reason exists to engage in EIA.
Thus, if a person is entitled by law to have a mineral lease renewed upon satisfying certain
conditions, the agency's only task may be to determine whether those conditions have been
met. In this circumstance, EIA may not offer any significant advantages. Of course, if the
agency retains the discretion to change the terms of the lease (as perhaps it should), or if the
conditions to be satisfied may be varied to reflect the particular circumstances presented by
the proposed action, some form of EIA may well be necessary and appropriate.
133. Peter Wathern, An Introductoiy Guide to EIA, in ENVIRONMENrAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT.
THEORY AND PRACTaCE 9 (Peter Wathern ed., 1988) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
AssEsmENT].
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dictions provide for two levels of EIA. 134 Where this approach is
taken, detailed statements are reserved for those projects which re-
quire government approval 135 and which may have a significant im-
pact on the environment. In any case, procedures become
necessary for making threshold judgments about whether and to
what extent EIA is appropriate.
3 6
In Australia, under the Schedule adopted pursuant to the Impact
Act,'37 "the action Minister shall, as soon as possible after any initia-
tive has been taken in relation to a proposed action, designate a
person or Department as the proponent ... and shall insure that
the Department [of Environment, Sport and Territories] is there-
upon informed of the proposed action.. ,"138 Following the Minis-
ter's referral, the Department of Environment, Sport and
Territories ("DEST") must determine whether to require prepara-
tion of an "environmental impact statement" ("EIS") or a "public
134. See Brian J. Preston, The Environmental Impact Statement Threshold Test: When is An Activ-
ity Likely to Significantly Affect the Environment?, 7 EvrL. & PLAN. L.J. 147, 160 (1990) (arguing
in favor of a two-level approach for EIA in New South Wales).
135. The proliferation of permitting requirements for activities which may pollute the en-
vironment most likely ensures that some form of governmental approval will be required for
any significant proposal. In Australia, however, this may be only state and not federal ap-
proval. While all states have an EIA process in place, the quality of the processes and their
implementation varies widely. It is hoped that the Intergovernmental Agreement on the
Environment will improve and help to make uniform all of the state and federal EIA
processes, although concern has been expressed that the Agreement could lead to a lowest
common denominator approach, at least on controversial issues. In the United States, any
significant project will have to comply with federal environmental legislation, but there are
three reasons why EIA requirements may not be triggered by pollution control. First, some
of the pollution control statutes specifically exempt NEPA. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 793 (1988)
(exempting actions taken pursuant to the U.S. Clean Air Act from NEPA compliance). Sec-
ond, in many cases, states are granted authority to issue permits without federal review of
individual permits. Thus, no federal approval is required. Finally, U.S. courts have occasion-
ally exempted agency actions from NEPA where an agency process under another statute was
deemed to be the "functional equivalent" of an EIA process. See, e.g., Envtl. Defense Fund,
Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486
F.2d 375, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Still, for any truly significant project, some type of federal
approval is likely, particularly in the western states where much of the land is owned by the
federal government.
136. Compare Commonwealth EPA Schedule, infra note 137, § 3.1.2(a) with 40 C.F.R.
§§ 1508.18 (defining "major federal action"), 1508.23 (defining "proposal"), 1508.25 (defin-
ing "scope"), and 1508.27 (defining "significantly"). See also BATES, supra note 5.
137. Schedule, Administrative Procedures, Environmental Protection (Impact of Propos-
als) Act 1974 (May 29, 1987) (order under section 6 of the Act, signed by N.M. Stephen,
Governor-General of Australia) [hereinafter Schedule].
138. Id. § 1.2.1.
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environment report" ("PER").'39 The procedures list twelve factors
to be considered in making this determination, but the decision is
largely committed to DEST's discretion. In addition, it is important
to understand that the initial referral decision by the "action Minis-
ter" is itself the subject of wide discretion. As noted above, referrals
are required "in relation to a proposed action." However, the pro-
cedures define "proposed actions" as those "matters affecting the
environment to a significant extent."'4 Thus, if the action Minister
determines that a matter does not meet this standard, he may sim-
ply determine that it is not a proposed action which requires refer-
ral to DEST. Indeed, in Australian Postal Corp. v. Botany Municipal
Council,141 the Federal Court held that a decision by the action Min-
ister not to refer a matter to DEST would be overturned only if it
were so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have
reached that conclusion.'
42
The broad discretion afforded the action Minister under the Aus-
tralian law raises the risk that decisions to prepare environmental
assessments may be influenced by political considerations. While it
may be appropriate to afford agencies some discretion, such discre-
tion can be better confined than is currently the case under Austra-
lian law.14
3
139. DEST can also refer this decision to the Minister for the Environment "who shall
forthwith determine the question .... " Id. § 3.1.1 (b).
140. Id. § 1.1 (referring to section 5 of the Impact Act).
141. 69 A.L.G.R. 86 (1989).
142. Under the Commonwealth's procedures, the action Minister's responsibility to refer
matters to the Department is limited to 'proposed actions." Schedule, supra note 137,
§ 1.2.1. Furthermore, a "proposed action" is defined as "a matter referred to in any of the
paragraphs of § 5 of the Act." If one reads section 5 of the Act, it is not clear whether the
reference to "paragraphs" in the procedures means the subparagraphs (a)-(e), or rather the
entire text of the provision. Importantly, if the former was intended, the action Minister
could not refuse to refer matters on the basis that they were not significant, since the signifi-
cance test is included in the broader context of section 5(1). In the Australian Postal Corpora-
tion case, however, the Federal Court held that the action Minister did indeed have the
authority to make the "significance" determination, thus confirming the action Minister's
broad discretion. Australian Postal Corp. v. Botany Mun. Council, 69 A.L.G.R. at 93. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court expressed concern that a narrower reading of section 5
"would mean that the formulation of any proposal... however trivial... would be within the
purview of... [a] 'proposed action'." Id. It is not clear, however, that the Court understood
that a "proposed action" finding simply results in a referral to the Department; it does not
mean that an EIS or even a PER is required.
143. In a recent report prepared by the Commonwealth Environmental Protection
Agency, the authors expressly recognize the need to introduce "greater accountability and
certainty into the triggering stage in the Commonwealth EIA process." COMMONwEALTH
ENvr. PROTECTON AGENcv, REVIEW OF ENMRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 76 (1994). The
two ideas specifically considered are the same two addressed in this article. The first would
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One method of confining agency discretion is to designate those
types of actions which require environmental impact assessment.
This approach has been used with some success in New South
Wales. Under the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment
Act 1979,144 matters which are "designated developments" require
preparation of an EIS. Designated developments are listed in
Schedule 3, which was promulgated under the NSW law, 145 and
which include a wide variety of generally private activities that typi-
cally cause a significant environmental impact.'
46
Another possible solution to this problem is to begin with the
presumption that, for any proposed action, EIA procedures apply.
The presumption could be rebutted only by showing that the pro-
posed action falls into a category or class of previously defined ac-
tions which should not be subject to EIA. If EIA is required, the
agency could then choose either to prepare an EIS, or to prepare a
more modest assessment which will aid the agency in deciding
whether a more detailed statement is required. This is essentially
the process that is used in the United States.
Under the U.S. CEQ regulations, an agency considering a pro-
posed action can make one of three decisions regarding EIA: (1) it
can decide to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS);
(2) it can decide to prepare an environmental assessment which
will, in part, help to determine whether an EIS is needed; or (3) it
can decide that the proposed action does not require an EIS or an
environmental assessment because the action is categorically ex-
cluded from EIA. 147 The EIS is the basic assessment document re-
quired for actions which may significantly affect the environment.
The environmental assessment ("EA") is a lesser creature that in-
establish a schedule of proposals which would automatically trigger the EIA process, much as
is done in New South Wales; the second would allow the public to request assessment of a
particular proposal, such as is allowed in Western Australia.
144. 1979 N.S.W. Stat. No. 203 (1979).
145. Designated Development, 1980 N.S.W.R. Regs. & B. 1142 (1980).
146. Schedule 3 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 1980, in-
cludes, for example, cement works, chemical factories, and oil refineries. The New South
Wales Department of Planning is currently engaged in a process to review Schedule 3 desig-
nated developments to determine whether changes may be necessary or appropriate. See
N.S.W. DEP'T OF PLANNING, WHEN is AN EIS REQumvRE? (1993). Those activities which are not
listed as designated developments under Part IV of the Act, may still require an EIS under
Part V of the Act if they are activities which require the approval of a "determining authority"
and are "likely to significantly affect the environment." See Preston, supra note 134.
147. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a) (1994).
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cludes some important elements of EIA. 148 In particular, the envi-
ronmental assessment must include "brief discussions of the need
for the proposal, of alternatives .... [and] of the environmental
impacts of the proposed action and alternatives[.]'1 49 "Categorical
exclusions" are categories of actions "which do not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environ-
ment[.]" 150 However, an agency may only claim that a proposed
action is categorically excluded if it has adopted procedures, follow-
ing public notice and comment, specifically identifying that particu-
lar category of actions as excluded from EIA processes.15' Like the
New South Wales system, this system brings a level of certainty to
the EIA process. A person can readily determine whether some
form of EIA will apply based simply on whether or not the proposed
action falls within a category listed in the agency's procedures.
Under the American system, a decision must still be made
whether to prepare an environmental assessment ("EA") or an envi-
ronmental impact statement ("EIS") and that decision is a matter of
considerable discretion. However, the criteria which must be con-
sidered by an agency in deciding whether to prepare an EIS are far
more specific under the American rules than they are under their
Australian counterparts. 52 Moreover, the public has an opportu-
nity to comment and participate in that initial decision by submit-
ting comments on a draft EA or similar document and consulting
with the agency involved in making the decision.
148. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1994).
149. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b) (1994).
150. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1994).
151. Examples of activities which might be categorically excluded are enforcement ac-
tions, decisions to issue permits for backpacking or camping on public lands, or non-mecha-
nized wood gathering activities. Some agencies, like the United States Forest Service, have
also excluded activities such as certain road construction activities on public lands, small
logging operations (less than one million board feet), or new roads up to one mile long to
service logging operations. National Environmental Policy Act Revised Policy and Proce-
dures, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,718, 19,745 (1991). One can reasonably argue that such actions are
not appropriately excluded under NEPA, for example, if they are proposed for roadless
areas.
152. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.4 (1994) (describing actions which require preparation of an
EIS), 1508.7 (definition of "cumulative impact"), 1508.18 (definition of "major Federal ac-
tion"), 1508.23 (definition of "proposal"), 1508.25 (definition of "scope"), and 1508.27 (defi-
nition of "significantly"), which define in detail key terms used in deciding whether an EIS is
needed. Indeed, an agency's failure to prepare an EIS appears to be the most frequently
litigated issue under NEPA. See 23 CoUcIL EiNtr. QuALrrY ANN. REP. 164-65 (1993). Plain-
tiffs have been successful in raising this claim in numerous important cases under the law.
WiLwima H. RODGERS, ENviRomrENTAL LAw § 9.5(B)(3) (1986).
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Despite the existence of extensive criteria to help guide its
threshold decision, federal EIA law in Australia confers too much
discretion on agency officials charged with making the key initial
decision as to whether to prepare an EIS, a public environment re-
port, or no document at all. Some means for confining that discre-
tion, perhaps under the New South Wales or American models,
would help to promote public trust in the EIA system.
153
The Australian EIA law is also open to criticism for failing to af-
ford the public an opportunity to question these threshold deci-
sions. Section 10 of the Impact Act allows any person to ask the
Minister for the Environment "to inform the person in writing as to
what action, if any, has been taken, or is proposed, for insuring
consideration of the environmental aspects of [a] matter." Unfor-
tunately, section 10 applies only to those matters encompassed by
section 5 of the Act. Thus, if the action Minister makes a threshold
determination that a proposed action is not subject to section 5 be-
cause it is not significant, it seems unlikely that section 10 would
apply. Moreover, no process exists for public notice of decisions by
action Ministers not to refer matters to DEST. Thus, it seems likely
that such matters will easily escape public scrutiny.
A far better system exists under the Western Australia Environ-
mental Protection Act 1986154 which allows any person to refer a
matter to that state's Environmental Protection Authority for a deci-
sion as to whether an assessment should be carried out.15 5 This
procedure insures an open process, with the prospect for public
involvement, in the threshold decision regarding whether to pre-
pare an environmental impact assessment.
153. Brian Preston has argued that the open-ended nature of threshold decision under
Part V of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act is a virtue in that it affords flexibil-
ity. Preston, supra note 134, at 147, 159-160. Preston acknowledges, however, that it may be
appropriate to confine the agency's discretion to make threshold decisions "along the lines
of the CEQ regulations." Id. at 160.
154. No. 87, 1986 W. Austl. Stat. 603 (1986).
155. The Environmental Protection Act provides in relevant part:
(1) A proposal that appears likely, if implemented, to have a significant effect on the
environment...
(b) may be referred in writing to the Authority by -
(i) the proponent; or
(ii) any other person.
Id. § 38. The Authority must provide a written response to the referral within 28 days. Id.
§ 40.
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While Australian authorities at the federal level struggle with the
initial decision as to whether to require an EIA, the efforts now be-
ing made toward unifying state and federal EIA procedures could
serve as a useful vehicle for improving all of the EIA systems operat-
ing in Australia. In addition to signing an Intergovernmental
Agreement on the Environment ("IGAE"), articulating governing
principles and policies for integrating environmental decision-mak-
ing,156 the Commonwealth and the states are developing uniform
procedures for EIA under the auspices of the Australia and New
Zealand Environment and Conservation Council ("ANZECC").
One of the goals of this laudable exercise is to provide a framework
for avoiding duplication of state and federal procedures.157 Unfor-
tunately, the IGAE goes well beyond this objective by requiring the
Commonwealth and the states to give "full faith and credit" to state
practices and procedures when exercising its EIA obligations. This
means that the Commonwealth must rely on the "outcomes" of
those state processes "as' a basis for their decision-making."158
While the meaning of these provisions is not entirely free of doubt,
the Agreement suggests a strong inclination on the part of the
Commonwealth to defer to the states in meeting its obligations
under the Impact Act. Indeed, some important cases which arose
under the Impact Act might have been resolved differently if the
draft agreement on EIA had been in effect. For example, a pro-
posed pulp mill at Wesley Vale in Tasmania was abandoned by the
project proponents in 1989 after the Commonwealth insisted that
the proponents meet more stringent pollution control require-
ments than would have been imposed by the Tasmanian govern-
ment. But construction of the mill met none of the three criteria
set out in the draft agreement which would allow the Common-
wealth to take the lead in EIA for that project. Accordingly, had the
IGAE been in effect, the Commonwealth might have been obliged
to defer to the "outcomes" of the state EIA process as a basis for its
decision. Likewise, the federal government's decision to refuse an
export license to facilitate sand mining on Fraser Island, which led
to the High Court's important decision in Murphyores Incorporated
156. IGAE, supra note 130, at Schedule 3.
157. See IGAE, sura note 130, § 2.5.4; ANZECC, Discussion Draft, Basis for a National
Agreement on Environmental Impact Assessment § 4.1 (1992) [hereinafter National
Agreement].
158. IGAE, supra note 130, § 1.5.
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Party Ltd. v. The Commonwealth,'59 might have been resolved differ-
ently if Queensland had undertaken its own environmental assess-
ment of the proposed mining project and concluded that the
exports should go forward.
Under a draft agreement on EIA prepared in accordance with
section 6.4 of the Agreement, the Commonwealth would take the
lead on EIA in only three circumstances: (1) when the Common-
wealth is the proponent; (2) when the proposal is on Common-
wealth land; or (3) when the Commonwealth has exclusive powers
over the proposal. 16° With the possible exception of the first, none
of these situations is likely to arise with any degree of regularity.
Moreover, even when significant national interests may be impli-
cated by a proposal, the federal government has proposed to defer
to state EIA processes unless one of the criteria noted above has
been met. The upshot of these IGAE provisions appears to be that
federal agencies with responsibilities overlapping those of the states
can avoid making difficult decisions. 16 1 On the other hand, making
tough decisions is what EIA is all about. Any process that attempts
to short-circuit the decision-making process undermines EIA. In-
deed, a discussion draft of proposed national EIA procedures re-
leased by the Australian and New Zealand Environmental
Conservation Council in November, 1992,162 appears to be
designed to force most actions into the state EIA processes, thereby
severely limiting the Commonwealth's responsibilities for EIA.
State processes are, currently, much better than the Common-
wealth's processes in many respects. 6 A unified scheme ought to
be designed to employ the best of each applicable system; thus no
state's processes need be sacrificed, and duplicative work can be
avoided without sacrificing government accountability for decision-
making.164
159. 136 C.L.R. 1 (Austl. 1976).
160. See IGAE, supra note 130, § 6.4.1.
161. Of course, one agency will still have to make the decision. But, by taking away from
the agency in the other jurisdiction the responsibility for a similar decision, the IGAE
removes an important check on the system.
162. See National Agreement, supra note 157.
163. See supra notes 144-46, 154-55 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Botany Mun. Council v. Federal Airports Corp., 175 C.L.R. 453 (1992). The
central issue in Botany was whether the New South Wales EIA process should apply to a fed-
eral proposal to build a third runway at the Sydney Airport. The High Court held that fed-
eral agencies were outside the scope of the state EIA process under the terms of the state
statute. Id. at 466. Even if the state EIA law had encompassed federal agencies, however, the
Court found that the federal EIA process established under the Impact Act would have pre-
1995]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw [Vol. 20:43
B. Applying EIA Early
One of the keys to EIA is its early application. Reasonable alter-
natives to a proposal cannot be fairly evaluated when momentum
already exists for a particular outcome. Unfortunately, it may be
difficult to justify the costs of EIA until momentum exists for a par-
ticular outcome. While this conundrum cannot be solved in every
case, it can be minimized if agencies can be persuaded to use EIA
proactively. For example, suppose a federal agency knows that cer-
tain public lands contain substantial economically recoverable coal
reserves. The agency might wait until a private party applies for
appropriate leases and permits to develop a particular tract of the
coal. Alternatively, the agency might simply conduct a study to
identify tracts most suitable for leasing and development based
upon a broad ranging consideration of environmental and eco-
nomic factors. As agencies become more familiar with integrated
resource management techniques, the need for earlier analyses
may become more obvious. 165 But, at present, most government
agencies react to proposals rather than anticipating them. As a
result, the analyses are not timely, and the choices available to the
agency are confined to those that best suit the applicant.
In the United States, early application of EIA is expressly man-
dated, 166 though, in practice, it has been difficult to achieve. 167 An
important boon to early application of EIA in the United States,
however, has been the common practice by federal land manage-
ment agencies of preparing environmental impact statements in
conjunction with their land management plans. While these EISs
do not address in sufficient detail the impacts on the environment
of site specific decisions, they do provide a broad framework from
which an agency is better able to make policy choices from among
empted the state EIA law. Id. at 470. As a result, the more stringent state provisions for EIA
were held inapplicable to the federal proposal for a new airport runway. Id.
165. If integrated resource management is carried out in the context of an EIA process,
government agencies will have a much better sense of how to address particular projects long
before those projects are even proposed. See David P. Grinlinton, Integrated Resource Manage-
ment - A Model for the Future, 9 EirvrL. & PLAN. L. J. 4 (1992).
166. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2 (1994) ("Agencies shall integrate the NEPA process with other
planning at the earliest possible time to insure that planning and decisions reflect environ-
mental values, to avoid delays later in the process, and to head off potential conflicts.")
167. The United States Supreme Court has held, for example, that NEPA did not require
the Department of Interior to prepare an EIS covering the entire Northern Great Plain re-
gion for a coal mining proposal where the Department did not propose any legislation on
the region or any major federal action, and the action would be local or federal, not regional,
in scope. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
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competing land uses. Furthermore, these planning EISs form the
foundation for future environmental analyses through the form
process developed by the CEQ called tiering. t68
The difficult obstacles to early application of EIA are exacerbated
in Australia by the common practice of allowing the private project
proponent to prepare the relevant EIA documents. As is discussed
in greater detail below, this raises serious questions about the objec-
tivity of the EIA process. 169 However, perhaps as importantly, it
often ensures that no EIS is prepared until a project is sufficiently
far along that a single company is willing to spend a substantial
amount of money to assess the environmental impacts of what that
company would like to do.
Consider, for example, the proposed mining activities at Corona-
tion Hill in the Northern Territory. The Commonwealth desig-
nated an area that encompassed the Coronation Hill site as a
conservation zone because of the substantial mineral deposits lo-
cated there. 170 The zone, however, was an "island" wholly within
the Kakadu National Park. Not surprisingly, proposals to mine the
conservation zone were controversial.
During the years 1988 and 1989, draft and final environmental
impact statements were prepared by the proponents of a proposed
gold, platinum, and palladium mining operation at Coronation
Hill. In 1975, the year the conservation zone was designated, EIA
might have been useful in exploring the various options, including
not mining in the conservation zone or mining in some other part
of the zone. Predictably, no such options were considered in the
draft and final EISs prepared by the proponents of the Coronation
Hill project. In the key section of the draft EIS entitled "Project
Alternatives," the authors discuss various means whereby the propo-
nents could accomplish their main objective of mining the ore de-
168. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (1994) ("'Tiering' refers to the coverage of general matters in
broader environmental impact statements ... with subsequent narrower statements or envi-
ronmental analyses... incorporating by reference the general discussions and concentrating
solely on the issues specific to the statement subsequently prepared.")
169. In the United States, preparation of an EIS by the private proponent of a project is
considered a conflict of interest. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c) (1994). Ironically, no such conflict is
perceived in the case of an environmental assessment, although in this case, the agency must
"make its own evaluation of the environmental issues and take responsibility for the scope
and content of the environmental assessment." Id. § 1506.5(b). As a practical matter, most
agencies prepare their own EAs as well as EISs, in part at least, to avoid public criticism that
the EA is not objective.
170. Under procedures provided in the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act, No.
12, 1975 Austl. Acts 106, § 7 (1975).
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posits. These included, for example, the type of mining techniques
to be used, the location of overburden sites, and the location of the
processing plant and residue dam. 171 No effort was made to ana-
lyze the alternative of not mining the deposits so that advantages
and disadvantages of each alternative might be fairly considered
along side one another.
Ironically, just that kind of analysis was prepared in the form of
an inquiry report by the Resource Assessment Commission.1 72 That
report ultimately led to a decision to ban mining in the conserva-
tion zone and to incorporate the zone into the park. The inquiry
report, however, was not even requested until April 1990, almost
one year after the final EIS was released and fifteen years after the
conservation zone was designated. The savings in both political
and financial capital that would have accrued had this decision
been made before the site-specific EIS was prepared are likely to
have been substantial. Plainly, however, such an analysis would not
have been made at such a sufficiently early stage in the EIA process
had it been required of the project proponent.173
The authors of the Wesley Vale EIS did a better job of outlining
the alternatives to the proposal for building a bleached kraft pulp
mill at Wesley Vale, Tasmania. In particular, six alternative site lo-
cations were reviewed as well as the "no action" alternative. 174 Un-
fortunately, by the time the EIS was released for public comment in
October, 1988,175 the key decision to locate the mill at Wesley Vale
171. Coronation Hill Draft EIS, 2-1 to 2-4 (Dec. 1988) (on file with the author) [hereinaf-
ter Coronation Hill DEIS].
172. The Resource Assessment Commission Act, No. 94, 1989 Austl. Acts 2309 (1989),
established the Commission "to hold inquiries, and make reports, in respect of resource mat-
ters[.]" Id. § 6.
173. See also RESOURCE ASSESSMENT COMM'N, FoREsT AND TIMBER INQUIRY, FINAL REPORT
(1992) (on file with the author) [hereinafter TIMBER INQUIRY]. "Conflict over forest use will
not be reduced if governments continue to rely on ad hoc, reactive mechanisms for accom-
modating the interests of more than one government in forest use decisions. The Inquiry
recommends that the Commonwealth and the states develop coordinated national strategies
and guidelines for prospective regional forest planning." Id. at xxxviii.
174. Wesley Vale Environmental Impact Statement, 3.1-3.11 (Oct. 1988) (on file with the
author) [hereinafter Wesley Vale EIS]. All of the other sites, however, were located in Tas-
mania, and all involved using the same wood supply. A broader view of the problem might
have considered locating a mill on the mainland and/or using a different source of supply.
175. There was no draft EIS prepared. The company had released an "environmental
review document" to the public in late March, 1988, but this was not done as part of the EIS
process. Indeed, the Commonwealth and Tasmanian governments did not agree on the
guidelines for preparation of the EIS until August, 1988.
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had already been made. 176 This occurred despite the fact that the
authors of the EIS acknowledged that "the environmental compari-
son [of the Burnie and Wesley Vale sites] is not particularly clear
cut although Wesley Vale would be considered slightly
preferable."
177
When the proponent prepares an EIS, the resulting document,
not surprisingly, focuses on what the proponent proposes to do.
While the proponent's proposal is likely to be in the best interest of
the proponent, it may not be the proposal which best suits the pub-
lic interest. 78 To be sure, many EISs will not be prepared until a
proposal has been made by a specific company, at a specific loca-
tion, and using a specific process. But even when this occurs, the
agency responsible for approving the action has the discretion, and
perhaps the obligation, to look beyond the proposal. Indeed, the
opportunity costs to society for going ahead with a project at the
behest of a particular proponent will never be fairly considered by
the project proponent. Yet the consideration of these costs is a crit-
ical part of EIA.
C. Ensuring an Informed Choice
Government agencies from around the world have acquired a
great deal of experience with EIA since the concept was first intro-
duced in the early 1970's. By applying this collective experience to
176. The EIS states: "Having established the preferred site for the proposed development,
a wide range of options were considered for different components of the proposed develop-
ment." Wesley Vale EIS, supra note 174, at 3.1.
177. Id. at 3.11. Notwithstanding this admission, in May, 1988, the project proponents
offered a seemingly different view of the Wesley Vale site in a four-page newspaper advertise-
ment which appeared in Tasmanian newspapers. See, e.g., A Special Report: Export Pulp Mill
Project, THE ADVOCATE, May 7, 1988, at 11-14. On the, second page of the advertisement, the
proponents described an interview with Mr. John Morgan, General Manager of the pulp mill
project. Mr. Morgan was asked to respond to a comment from a group of Wesley Vale resi-
dents that the mill would be better sited elsewhere. Morgan replied: "The Wesley Vale site is
the best from an environmental viewpoint and also from an 'economic viewpoint. Those are
the facts." Id. at 12.
178. This is not intended as criticism of project proponents, for they are expected to act in
their own interests or that of their shareholders, and not in the general public interest. It
does suggest, however, that the problem cannot be corrected merely by affording greater
scrutiny of EISs which are prepared by private proponents. See alsoJohn Formby, Environmen-
tal Impact Assessment: Where Has it Gone Wrong? EJA and the Tasmanian Woodchip Controversy, 4
ErvrL. & PLAN. L. J. 191 (1987). Formby suggests that when a proposal is contentious, im-
portant and complex, it is too much to expect the proponent-based EIS to produce a satisfac-
tory result. Id. at 198. Accordingly, Formby recommends broader use of the inquiry process,
and points to the Ranger Uranium Inquiry as an example of the successful use of this pro-
cess. Id. at 198-99.
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individual programs, agencies can help to ensure that they are mak-
ing an informed choice when facing decisions which may have ad-
verse consequences for the environment. 179 An informed decision
can best be assured if the EIA process includes the following
elements:
(1) it employs competent experts from various relevant
disciplines;
(2) it includes a scoping process to help identify both the impor-
tant and the unimportant issues;
(3) it analyzes a reasonable array of alternatives to the proposed
action;
(4) it considers the relative monetary and non-monetary costs
and benefits of each alternative;
(5) it looks at the cumulative impacts of all past, present, and
reasonably foreseeable future actions;
(6) it is based upon a credible data base sufficient to allow a thor-
ough analysis of the environmental consequences of the pro-
posed action and the alternatives with a reasonable degree of
scientific certainty.
1. Interdisciplinary Approach
If the public is to have confidence in the information presented
in the EIS, it must be satisfied that the persons involved in prepar-
ing the document have sufficient experience and expertise to un-
derstand the proposed action and the likely impacts that can be
expected from that action. Typically, this means assembling an in-
terdisciplinary team of experts. NEPA contains a specific require-
ment to implement this goal.180 Australia has no counterpart
requirement in its statute or procedures and does not appear to
impose such a requirement in the guidelines that it sets for EIS
preparation.""' While the consultants involved in preparing EISs
generally appear to include people from appropriate disciplines, an
EIS should clearly state the names and qualifications of the persons
responsible for preparing the EIS so that the reviewing agency, as
179. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 133, which discusses EIA is-
sues and problems from an international perspective.
180. NEPA requires all Federal agencies to "utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach
which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental
design arts. .. ." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (A) (1988). See also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.6 (1994), which
makes clear that this requirement applies in the context of EIS preparation.
181. See, e.g., Mount Todd Gold Project Draft EIS, Guidelines for EIS preparation Appen-
dix 1. The Mount Todd Draft EIS does list the study team and acknowledges assistance from
other sources. It does not, however, list the qualifications of the persons involved in the
study.
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well as the public, can assess their qualifications.18 2 Furthermore,
government assessments of privately prepared EISs should be car-
ried out by persons with sufficient expertise to insure that the re-
view is credible.
2. Scoping
For almost any proposal, one can postulate an infinite number of
alternatives. Furthermore, a lot of time and money can be spent
gathering and analyzing more and better data on an infinite variety
of environmental issues. "Scoping" is a term that has come to be
used to describe the process for honing the scope of an EIS so that
it is a manageable document that addresses all relevant concerns
without exhausting limited resources on issues for which there is
little or no concern or environmental threat. 83 Carried out prop-
erly, it amounts essentially to an EIA "brainstorming" process. Dur-
ing public scoping meetings, the public can suggest alternative
courses of action that should be considered as well as other courses
that should not. They can, for example, suggest focusing on partic-
ular species of wildlife (rather than all species that might inhabit
the impacted area), either because those chosen are "keystone" or
"indicator" species that will help biologists to understand and pre-
dict broader environmental effects, or because impacts to those
particular species are of great public concern.
Scoping is critical to the success of EIA for two reasons. First, it
ensures that the proponent and other interested parties have an
opportunity to describe relevant issues and concerns before anyone
has committed substantial resources to carrying out the analysis.
Perhaps as importantly, scoping affords an opportunity to identify
issues and potential problems which are not important and which
do not merit substantial analysis. Thus, it is the scoping process,
182. The CEQ regulations require that the EIS list the names and the qualifications of the
persons primarily responsible for preparing the EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.17 (1994). Bill Rod-
gers notes that "disclosure [of the persons responsible for preparing the EIS] is an important
fall-back protection against statement bias." He further argues that "preparer disclosure
rules [promote] pride of authorship and responsibility for content [and thus] should help
improve the quality of EISs." WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENrAL LAW § 9.6(B) (1) (b)
(1986).
183. See also Gordon Beanlands, Scoping Methods and Baseline Studies in EIA, in ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 133, at 33 ("[There] is a somewhat belated recognition of
the need to establish clearly the focal point for an assessment at the outset; failure to do so
severely limits the probability of obtaining useful and creditable results.")
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more than any other, which helps to ensure that EIA is both cost-
effective and relevant to the decision at hand.
Scoping is an integral part of the EIA process in the United States
and is required by the CEQ regulations. 184 A public scoping pro-
cess, as described above, is not conducted as part of EIA in Austra-
lia. 185 On the contrary, public involvement in EIA in Australia is
usually not required and, thus, rarely occurs before the draft EIS
stage. Still, there are signs that the Australian government is begin-
ning to recognize the need to promote earlier public involvement
in the EIA process.186 Efforts to "scope" proposals have been made
in a few state EIA processes, and scoping is currently required in
certain cases under the guidelines promulgated by the Victorian
government under the Environmental Effects Act 1978.187 Adding
a public scoping component to Australia's EIA process could be ac-
184. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1994).
185. References to scoping in Australian EIA literature tend to concern merely the scope
of issues to be considered in the broader EIA process. Cf Peter G. Fairweather, Where is the
Science in EIA?, 20 SEARcH 141, 143 .(1989) ("[E]nvironmental scientists [should agree] at an
early stage with decision-making bodies ... as to what are the crucial questions and issues for
a given development or activity"). In Australia, scoping is not viewed as a separate process as it
is in the United States. The CEQ rules describe "scoping" as "an early and open process for
determining the scope of issues to be addressed and for identifying the significant issues
relating to a proposed action." 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1994)(emphasis added). "Scope," by
contrast, is defined as ."the range of actions and alternatives and impacts to be considered in
an environmental impact statement." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (1994). It is thus not surpising
that the lack of public participation in scoping has not been identified as a significant con-
cern. At least one Australian scientist has recognized the value of a scoping process, though
he did not describe it in those terms. Fairweather argues that "[clognitive difficulties can be
overcome by environmental scientists agreeing at an early stage with decision-making bodies
... as to what are the crucial questions and issues for a given development or activity."
Fairweather, supra, at 143.
186. In a recent report, the Commonwealth EPA recommended adding a scoping process
based upon experiences with such processes in New Zealand and Canada. COMMONWEALTH
ENV'T PROTECTION AGENCY, REVIEW OF COMMONWEALTH ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT
§ 5.3.5 (1994). See National Agreement, supra note 157, which promotes as one of four "Prin-
ciples for the Public" the need to "[b]ecome involved in the early stage of the process ...."
In addition to promoting greater public involvement, a scoping process should help to im-
prove the content of EIA documents by helping to focus those documents on the most im-
portant issues.
187. Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment and the Environmental Effects Act
1978 (on file with the author) [hereinafter Guidelines]. Public scoping is required in Victo-
ria whenever the Minister for Planning and Housing establishes a "Consultative Committee"
to guide preparation of an Environmental Effects Statement ("EES"). The guidelines define
public scoping as "a process which involves proponents drawing up a list of subjects to be
covered in the EES, preferably in liaison with the Department's Environmental Assessment
Branch and Regional Planning Staff." Id. at 6. This process results in a scoping document
which is made available for public comment. According to the guidelines "the draft outline
[of the EES] must be revised to cover issues of public concern." Id.
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complished simply and inexpensively. However, it would have a
profound impact not only on the ability of the public to participate
in a meaningful way but also on the quality of agency decisions.188
3. Alternatives Analysis
The U.S. Council on Environmental Quality has described the
analysis of alternatives as the "heart" of the EIS. i8 9 Indeed, since
the principal goal of EIA is informed decision-making, a reasonable
array of choices with a comparative assessment of their merits will
be critical to achieving that goal. Thus, in a good EIS, the alterna-
tives analysis is not a separate section of a broader document.
Rather, in large measure, it is the document. The discussion of
such matters as environmental consequences and costs and benefits
are thus presented in a comparative form which allows the decision
maker to better understand the available choices. 190
Over the past ten years, the EIS process in the United States has
largely evolved to this stage. While problems remain with individ-
ual documents, most U.S. agencies now understand the importance
of the alternatives analysis to the broader document. 91 This idea,
188. See Formby, supra note 178, at 199. Although Formby does not mention scoping spe-
cifically, he suggests that the EIA process could be improved by introducing "a much higher
level of public participation, particularly in the early stages of the process." Id. The scoping
process suggested here would accomplish this objective.
189. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1994).
190. Both the CEQ rules and the Australian procedures require that the key discussions of
the affected environment, and the environmental consequences, be carried out for each of
the alternatives studied. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (1994) with Schedule, supra note 137,
§ 4.1 (g-h). As noted below, however, EISs in Australia rarely consider actual alternatives to
the proposed action, let alone a reasonable range of such alternatives. Thus, the require-
ment for a comparative study seems to be rendered meaningless.
191. A recent decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, suggests a disturbing trend away from this approach. Citizens Against Burling-
ton, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 616 (1991), involved a
challenge by a citizens group to a decision by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to
approve a proposal by the City of Toledo, Ohio to expand its airport. The expansions were
intended to accommodate Burlington Air Express, which was proposing to move its air cargo
operations from Fort Wayne, Indiana to Toledo. Burlington reviewed 17 sites throughout
the midwestern United States before choosing Toledo. Upon choosing Toledo, the city ap-
plied to the FAA for approval of the proposed expansion. In the EIS prepared for the action
the FAA considered only two alternatives: the proposed action, and no action. Citizens
Against Burlington (CAB) complained that the proposed expansion would threaten one of
twelve remaining oak savannah sites in the world, and that other reasonable, alternative sites
for the cargo hub existed. In an opinion by Judge Clarence Thomas (now Supreme Court
Justice Thomas), the court rejected CAB's challenge. In doing so, the court accepted the
agency's finding in the EIS, which stated that "[w]here the Federal government acts not as a
proprietor, but to approve and support a project being sponsored by a local government or
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however, does not appear to have taken hold in Australia.1 92 Part
private applicant... the Federal government's consideration of alternatives may accord sub-
stantial weight to the preferences of the applicant. .. ." Id. at 197. Should this interpreta-
tion of the law be accepted throughout the country it would severely undermine the
requirement that all reasonable alternatives be considered. To be sure, it is not yet settled
law. The opinion appears to be contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Van Abbema v. Fornell, 807 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, while
Judge Thomas was joined in his opinion by one other judge, Judge Buckley dissented from
the decision on the grounds that the alternatives analysis was not adequate.
192. Consider the following examples:
CORONATION HILL GOLD MINE: The discussion of alternatives in the EIS on the proposed
Coronation Hill mining projects is essentially limited to a three page table, and less than two
pages of text. Most of the "alternatives" considered relate to small sub-components of the
larger project, such as methods of mining, the source of power, and the appropriate site for
placement of the overburden, a mineral processing plant and a residue dam. Coronation
Hill DEIS, supra note 171, § 2.1.2. The analysis of the "no development" alternative describes
only the advantages of the project; the disadvantages are noted by referencing, without de-
scription, the two broad sections in the EIS which describe the potential environmental and
social impacts. Id. § 2.1.2.2.
McARTHUR RJVER LEAD/ZtNc/SILVFR MINE: The McArthur River Draft EIS addresses alter-
native mining methods, transport options, water management options, alternative sites for
tailings disposal, and alternatives sources of power. Alternatives to the location and size of
the mining operation itself are not even discussed. To be sure, there may not be any reason-
able alternative location or size. As Charles Park once noted: "Minerals are where you find
them. The quantities are finite.... If there were a copper deposit in Yellowstone National
Park, I'd recommend mining it." JOHN MCPHEE, ENCOUNTERS wrrH AN ARCHDRUID 21 (1971).
But some basic information about the location and extent of the mineral deposits and the
speed with which the mineral deposits might profitably be developed would seem indispensa-
ble to reasoned decision-making. Moreover, even for those options that were considered, the
decision seemed to have already been made at the time of the draft EIS. Regarding a contro-
versial question on the location of a haul road, the Review states: "Option 6 (use of the
existing road through Borroloola) is the preferred option and was selected due to the relatively
low cost in constructing and operating the loading facility." COMMoNwEALTH ENV'T PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS FOR THE MCARTHUR RIVER ZINC-LEAD-SILVER
PROJECT, § 2.5.3 (August 1992). Following substantial criticism of the company's decision to
haul through Borroloola, the company agreed in the Supplemental EIS to bypass the town.
Surely it would have been better from a public relations point of view and for generating
support for the proposal, if this option was first proposed through a scoping process, consid-
ered in a draft EIS and then chosen in a final EIS, in response to public concerns.
WESLEY VALE PUL' MILL: The EIS for the proposed kraft pulp mill at Wesley Vale does a
better job of describing the proposed alternatives. See Wesley Vale EIS, supra note 174, § 3.
But by the time the EIS was released to the public for comment, the key decision to locate
the mill at Wesley Vale had already been made, without the opportunity for public comment,
and without the opportunity for agency scrutiny of that decision. Perhaps, as the company
claimed, Wesley Vale was the best choice from both an environmental and economic point of
view. See Special Report: Export Pulp Mill Project, THE ADVOCATE, May 7, 1988. By excluding
both the government agency and the public from that decision, it is difficult to avoid the
suspicion that the company's choice of Wesley Vale was made more for economic than envi-
ronmental reasons. Indeed, the EIS itself reinforces this suspicion. ("[T]he environmental
comparison [between the Burnie and Wesley Vale sites] is not particularly clear cut although
Wesley Vale would be considered slightly preferable.") Wesley Vale EIS, supra note 174, at
§ 3.11.
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of the blame must again be ascribed to the decision to allow prepa-
ration of the EIS by the project proponent. A company proposing
to build a kraft pulp mill at a particular location cannot be ex-
pected to fairly analyze a proposal to establish a similar mill at an-
other location by a competitor.195 Yet it is choices like these which
must concern the decision maker. A decision to locate a major mill
at a bad site has opportunity costs-it likely reduces the prospect
for opening another mill at another location which might be more
suitable from an environmental and/or economic perspective. It is
critically important that such costs be considered if EIA is to work
properly.
EDEN EXPORT WOODCHIP OPERATIONS: This was an EIS prepared under the New South
Wales Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. It offers an example of an EIS
prepared by a government agency-the Forestry Commission. The range of alternatives that
were considered in the draft EIS were quite broad. They included, for example, different
harvesting methods that would produce the same amount of wood products, different har-
vesting levels that might promote other uses of the resource, and no further woodchip pro-
duction. Eden Export Woodchip Draft EIS § 6 (April 1986) (on file with the author). After
receiving criticism of its alternatives analysis during the public comment period, the Commis-
sion examined a number of different alternatives, including alternative uses of the pulpwood
resource, alternative land uses, alternative sources of pulpwood, alternative cutting schedules
and alternative industries. Id. Despite the Commission's laudable efforts to consider a com-
prehensive range of alternatives, two fundamental problems with the analysis remained.
First, because no scoping process was employed, the agency was unable to focus its energy on
a more limited range of alternatives which might truly offer viable options to the agency.
Second, and more importantly, as with every other Australian EIS reviewed, no effort was
made to consider each of the alternatives in the context of the broader EIS. No effort was
made, for example, to identify the "affected environment" for each alternative, or to assess
and display the environmental and other consequences of each alternative. Thus, the EIS
offered no basis for choice from among the alternatives. Rather it served primarily to sup-
port the decision which apparently had already been made.
AQUA DEL RAY INTERNATIONAL WH1TSUNDAY RESORT: This was reviewed on the basis of a
public environment report. The alternatives analysis consists of four lines, essentially con-
cluding that "the site proposed meets the constraint more effectively than other possible
locations." Aqua Del Rey Int'l Whitsunday Resort Pub. Env't. Rep., § 1.4 (July 1988) (on file
with the author). No other "possible locations" are mentioned, but the fact that "other possi-
ble locations" existed suggests a need for some discussion of alternatives. Indeed, a decision
to build a resort in one location in the Whitsundays will almost certainly have an impact on
plans and proposals to build or upgrade other resorts in the area. Surely, some considera-
tion of these alternatives was warranted. The first come, first served approach does not ad-
dress the potential opportunity costs associated with a proposal.
193. As one consultant has noted, "For private sector developments, the proponent sel-
dom reaches the point of exhibition of an EIS with any genuine alternatives to his proposed
development still in hand. The proponent is usually well locked into a particular site and
form of development by the time the EIS is exhibited .... " W.R. Woodhead, The Consultant's
Perspectiv reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: SELECTED READINGS (Sharon
Beder ed. 1991).
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One of the most important reasons for promoting a thorough
discussion of all reasonable alternatives is the possibility that this
discussion might aid in the identification of an option that satisfies
the needs and concerns of all interested parties. By abandoning
the requirement for a thorough and early analysis of reasonable
alternatives, the prospect for achieving a "win/win" solution 194 to
controversial problems is likewise abandoned. The political and
legal consequences for such an approach are potentially enormous.
4. Cost-Benefit Analysis
An economic analysis of a proposed action and all reasonable al-
ternatives can be extremely helpful to an agency seeking to make
an informed choice from among the alternatives. 95 In the United
States, several agencies routinely use cost-benefit analysis in con-
junction with EIA preparation. 196 But, while the direct monetary
costs and benefits of a proposal are certainly relevant to an in-
194. See, e.g., STEVEN Covav, THE SEVEN HABITS OF HIGHLY EFFEcrtvE PEOPLE (1990). Ac-
cording to Covey, "Win/win is based on the paradigm that ... one person's success is not
achieved at the expense or exclusion of the success of others. Win/win is a belief in a Third
Alternative. It's not your way or my way; it's a better way, a higher way." Id. at 207 (emphasis
in original). This "win/win" approach, as described by Covey, would appear to be the essen-
tial reason for looking at alternatives. See also ROGER FISHER & WILUAM URY, GETrING TO YES
(2d ed. 1991).
195. The CEQ regulations provide that if an agency chooses to prepare a cost-benefit anal-
ysis, "it shall be incorporated by reference or appended to the statement as an aid in evaluat-
ing the environmental consequences." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (1994). The rules warn agencies,
however, that "the weighing of the merits and drawbacks of the various alternatives need not
be displayed in a monetary cost-benefit analysis and should not be where there are important
qualitative considerations." Id.
196. Forest Service planning regulations state that "[t]he primary goal in formulating al-
ternatives, besides complying with NEPA procedures, is to provide an adequate basis for iden-
tifying the alternative that comes nearest to maximizing net public benefits .... " 36 C.F.RI
§ 219.12(0 (1994). The regulations require that "[d]irect and indirect benefits and costs" be
analyzed in detail. Id. § 219.12 (g)(3). Army Corps of Engineers regulations state that "[n]o
[404] permit will be granted which involves the alternation ofwedands... unless the district
engineer concludes ... that the benefits of the proposed alteration outweigh the damage to
the wetland resource." 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(4) (1994). While not requiring cost-benefit
analysis, the Council on Environmental Quality regulations state "an environmental impact
statement should at least indicate [ ] considerations, including factors not related to environ-
mental quality, which are likely to be relevant and important to a decision." 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.23 (1994). See also Colin S. Diver, Poligymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95
-LRv. L. REv. 393, 416-17 (1981) (discussing the increase in cost-benefit analysis by
agencies).
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formed choice, agencies must not lose sight of important costs and
benefits that are not so easily quantified.
197
Recent advancements in economic theory have greatly improved
the ability of economists to assess such costs and benefits.198 How-
ever, skepticism still exists, and substantial differences in opinion,
even among the economic experts, remains. 99 Acknowledging
these difficulties does not mean that cost-benefit analysis is inappro-
priate. It does suggest, however, that such analyses must be con-
ducted with great care and with a fair recognition of the limitations
of the methodology. Still, some kind of matrix of costs and benefits
seems indispensable to informed decision-making and if, as is so
often the case, the costs and benefits include substantial environ-
mental components, the cost-benefit analysis becomes integral to a
comprehensive EIA process.
197. Indeed, NEPA requires federal agencies to "identify and develop methods and proce-
dures.., which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values
may be given appropriate consideration in decision-making along with economic and techni-
cal considerations." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1988).
198. See, e.g., LFYANNE C. WILKs, A SURVEY OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1990)
(on file with the author).
199. Terry Anderson and Donald Leal, for example, have argued for market allocation of
essentially all natural resources. TFRRY L ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FRE MARKET EN-
VIRONMENTALISM (1991). Mark Sagoff disagrees with this approach:
Social regulation most fundamentally has to do with the identity of a nation - a
nation committed historically, for example, to appreciate and preserve a fabulous natu-
ral heritage and to pass it on reasonably undisturbed to future generations. This not a
question of what we wang it is not exactly a question of what we believe in; it is a question
of what we are ....
Cost-benefit analysis does not, because it cannot, judge opinions and beliefs on their
merits but asks instead how much might be paid for them, as if a conflict of views could
be settled in the same way as a conflict of interests. Analysts who take this approach, of
course, tend to confuse views with interests. They do this by giving political, ethical, and
cultural convictions technical names - "bequest values," "existence values," "in-
tangibles," "fragile values" or "soft variables" - as if by the nomenclature they could
transform beliefs that have carried the day before legislatures into the data of economic
methodology ....
[W]hen cost-benefit analysis attempts to do the work of ethical and political judg-
ment, it loses whatever objectivity it might have had and becomes a tool of partisan
politics... [W]hen cost-benefit analysis assigns "shadow" prices to "amenity," "option,"
"bequest," and other citizen beliefs and values, theoretical "breakthroughs" replace
sound judgment and common sense. At that point, economic analysis deteriorates into
storytelling and hand-waving likely to convince no one except those partisans who agree
with - and possibly have paid for - its results.
MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 17, 38-39 (1988).
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5. Cumulative Impacts
Environmental impacts from a particular project or proposal can-
not be viewed in isolation from the impacts that may result from
other projects in the same ecosystem. Thus, it is generally agreed
that an EIS should assess the cumulative environmental effects from
the proposed activity together with all past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable future activities. 200 While there is general agreement,
however, about the need for cumulative analyses, it can be a diffi-
cult task. This is particularly evident when environmental assess-
ments have not been prepared or are not readily available from any
past actions which may cause cumulative impacts. While this prob-
lem has begun to receive some attention in the United States, sig-
nificant problems remain. An agency's failure to analyze the
cumulative impacts of related actions is a frequent claim in NEPA
litigation.201 These problems will, likely, prove even more severe in
Australia, since past EISs are not as readily available as they are in
the United States.
20 2
Geographical information systems and relational data base man-
agement systems should be developed in both countries to provide
current data about local environments throughout each respective
200. The CEQ rules make clear that an American EIS must address all cumulative impacts
which it defines as "the impact on the environment which results from the incremental im-
pact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future ac-
tions . . . ." 40 C.F.RI § 1508.7 (1994). See also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2) (1994). Similar
requirements are generally imposed in Australia. See, e.g., National Agreement, supra note
157, § 5.1 (f) which admonishes assessing authorities to "[e]nsure that the total and cumula-
tive effects of using or altering community environmental assets . . . receive explicit
consideration."
201. See, e.g., Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1988); Fritiofson v.
Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1985); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
202. In carrying out research for this article, I made extensive inquiries regarding the
availability of EISs that were prepared for past projects. Often these documents are unavaila-
ble, even at the government agency's own libraries. Occasionally, individual documents can
be found. For example, the Wesley Vale EIS is available at the National Library of Australia,
but EISs for the Mount Todd and McArthur River mines could not be found there. The
Southeast Region Environment Center had a copy of the draft EIS for the Coronation Hill
mine, but not a copy of the final document. (The final EIS was eventually obtained from the
mining company's library after repeated efforts to locate the document at public institutions
failed.) The Environment Center also lacked copies of the Mount Todd and McArthur River
EISs, although these documents were eventually ordered at my request. The Commonwealth
Environment Protection Agency appears to have a reasonably complete set of federal EISs
but even these documents are not indeed on the government library's computer indexing
system.
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nation. 203 These data bases must be made available to the general
public so that the public is able to comment on a proposal on the
basis of the best available information.
While geographical information systems can help to address past
and present cumulative impacts, reasonably foreseeable future ac-
tions must also be considered. Indeed, only by addressing propos-
als for future actions in the project area can an assessing agency
understand the opportunity costs of a given project. This will con-
tinue to be a difficult problem both in the U.S. and in Australia.
The problem will, however, be exacerbated in Australia so long as
the proponent prepares the EIS. In most cases, future projects will
not involve the proponent of a present proposal. Thus, the propo-
nent has little incentive to consider such projects. Indeed, a fair
evaluation of potential future projects could cast the proponent's
project in a bad light, thereby making such an evaluation undesir-
able from the proponent's perspective.
6. Credible Scientific Studies
a. Adequacy of the Data Base-An assessment of environmental
impacts is only as reliable as the data upon which it is based. As a
result, the development of a credible data base is recognized as a
critical component of EIA. Unless data is available from previous
studies, however, development of a credible data base takes time -
203. Australia has embarked on an ambitious program to develop a National State of the
Environment Reporting System that, when fully implemented, should accomplish this goal.
See COMMONWEALTH ENV'T PROTECTION AGENCY, DISCUSSION PAPER ON DEVELOPMENT OF A NA-
TIONAL STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT REPORTING SYSTEM (Dec. 1992); COMMONWEALTH ENVr'L
PROTECTION AGENCY, FACTS SHEET: NATIONAL STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT REPORTING SYSTEM
(May 21, 1993). In the United States, the Council on Environmental Quality has been gath-
ering statistical and other general data for more than 20 years and compiling this informa-
tion in an Annual Report. See, e.g., 22 COUNCAL ENVTL. QuALrrv ANN. REP. (1992). More
specific geographical information systems are being developed to assist public land managers
in the United States as they engage in land use planning functions in accordance with the
public land management laws. Finally, the United States government has recently estab-
lished a National Biologic Survey ("NBS").
This new agency was established by order of the United States Department of the Interior
Secretary Bruce Babbitt in accordance with the authority provided by sections 2 and 5 of the
Reorganization Plan No. 3, 64 Stat. 1262 (1950), transmitted March 13, 1950, effective May
24, 1950. It is charged with gathering, analyzing and disseminating "the biological informa-
tion necessary for the sound stewardship of our Nation's natural resources and to foster
understanding of biological systems and the benefits they provide to society." 58 Fed. Reg.
63,387 (1993). The House authorized $163.5 million to get the new agency off the ground in
1993. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
138, 107 Stat. 1379 (1993).
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usually a minimum of one year and often longer. In particular, in-
formation about the flora and fauna in a particular ecosystem can-
not be accurately collected when entire seasons are ignored.20 4 In
the face of these scientific requirements, government agencies face
enormous pressure from project proponents to act quickly, and
governments have too often responded with "fast-tracking"
processes, which do not allow sufficient time to develop a credible
data base. This appears to have been the result, for example, in the
case of the McArthur River Mine - a proposed lead and zinc mine
located in the Northern Territory near the town of Borroloola on
the Gulf of Carpentaria. The fast track process used in this case
resulted in the preparation of an EIS in record time.2 05 The deci-
sion to require an EIS was made on March 3, 1992. Incredibly, the
company had proposed to have the Draft EIS completed in only six
weeks, though it actually took the company about ten weeks. Seven
weeks thereafter, the final EIS was released, and a decision approv-
ing the project was made 'the following month.
While there is nothing inherently wrong with the idea of "fast-
tracking" projects if it can be done in a manner that allows for an
adequate EIA process,20 6 it is often difficult. Moreover, when an
204. One commentator has noted that
The most obvious of these (limitations and errors in scientific studies for EISs] concerns
the meager time frame that is allowed for most assessments. Rarely is even a full year
available for impact studies before development, the more common period is but a few
months .... This apparent disregard for biological data occurs despite the given re-
quirement for environmental consideration and a widespread understanding that the
biological parts of the natural systems at risk operate according to the seasons. Ecologi-
cally important but episodic phenomena, such as.the breeding behavior of organisms or
floods in watercourses at the site of impact are easily missed by such brief surveys.
The resulting reports of such brief studies must necessarily present a static view of the
habitat and its ecological communities of animals, plants and microbes (often presented
as only a species list). Yet ecology is not a static science; it is concerned with the very
processes of life.
Fairweather, supra note 185, at 141.
205. The EIS was actually prepared in accordance with the Northern Territory EIA legisla-
tion. That legislation, however, is quite similar to the Commonwealth's legislation. By a
letter dated April 18, 1992 (on file with the author), Ros Kelly, the Commonwealth Minister
for the Arts, Sport, the Environment and Territories, indicated to Mike Reed, the Northern
Territory's Minister for Conservation, that a separate Commonwealth EIS would not be nec-
essary so long as the Commonwealth's requirements were accommodated.
206. If, for example, a company is warned in advance by regulation or otherwise, that the
EIS will require data to be collected over a period of 18 months, advance planning can help
to ensure that this data is collected very early in the life of the project. This does not often
happen, however. Fairweather notes one case, for example, where engineering studies were
ongoing for three years, before the company collected biological data, which was gathered
over a mere two months. Fairweather, supra note 185, at 142.
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inadequate data base exists, it is impossible to complete an EIA
quickly. It is not surprising that the EIS prepared for the McArthur
River Mine was so seriously deficient as to lead one scientist to note
The McArthur River EIS does not appear to have been written to
gain government approval. I am left wondering if this was in fact
intended as a document to ensure rejection of the proposal.
Based on the level of information provided that would be a logi-
cal outcome, despite the fact that the areas which would be af-
fected by the proposal could probably be managed to minimize
the negative impacts of the mine development[.] 20
7
Professor Sullivan's comments are supported by the evaluations of
the EIS that were prepared by both the Commonwealth and North-
ern Territory governments. Each makes clear that the EIS pre-
pared for the McArthur River project was far from complete.
Nonetheless, both governments approved the project subject only
to the requirement that the proponent prepare detailed additional
studies before proceeding with the project.20 8 This solution to the
problems with the EIS turns the EIA process on its head. The de-
tailed studies required by EIA are intended to assist the agency in
its decision-making process. Once the project has been approved,
the agency can do little more than require additional mitigation
measures. However, even at this point, the agency is limited by
practical and economic constraints, which are likely to be portrayed
as substantial once the company has received the government's ap-
proval to go forward with a project.
2° 9
207. Interview with Professor Marjorie Sullivan, North Australia Research Unit, ANU, Dar-
win. See also Sue Jackson, McArthur River:. Slashing the Black Tape, Slashing the Green, ANU REP.,
Aug. 25, 1993; Freya Dawson, A Major Mining Project is Fast Tracked in the Northern Territory, But
at What Cost, 30 IMPAcr 6 (1993).
208. In its review of environmental impacts for the McArthur River Mine, the Common-
wealth EPA notes: "The Agency agrees with the EIS conclusion that there is a need for the
collection of further baseline data... [and] . . . considers that the surveys proposed in the
EIS provide a means for adequately addressing the existing shortfall in information... Data
from these surveys ... will provide a baseline against which identified impacts arising from the mining
operation can be measured." COMMONWEALTH ENV'T PROTECTION AGENCY, REVIEW OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACTS FOR THE MCARTHUR RxVER LEAD-ZINC-SILVER PRojEar, at 3 (Aug. 1992) (em-
phasis added) (on file with the author). One wonders about the purpose of the EIS, if it was
not intended to measure the impacts arising from the mining operation.
209. In the United States, the CEQ regulations require that an EIS "be prepared early
enough so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the decision-making
process and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already made." 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.5 (1994). Moreover, courts have generally construed NEPA as requiring preparation
of an EIS "before any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources" has been
made. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Sun
Exploration and Protection Co. v, Lujan, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989). See also Thomas v. Peterson,
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The pressure on government agencies to act quickly in cases
which appear to offer substantial economic benefits to a commu-
nity can be enormous. In this sense, the decision to approve the
McArthur River Mine despite significant problems with the EIS is
understandable. Unfortunately, it is decisions such as this which
undermine the entire EIA process by inviting future proponents to
submit similarly deficient EISs. Indeed, a proponent is in a much
stronger position to secure a favorable decision on a proposal if it
can avoid essential data collection until after a project has been ap-
proved. By contrast, if agencies are willing to make tough decisions
and require complete analyses before projects are approved, propo-
nents will soon get the message that they need to commence their
environmental studies at the same time and in conjunction with
feasibility and engineering studies for a proposed project.
b. The Need for Scientific Rigor--Another problem with some
EISs is their lack of scientific rigor. Fairweather reports that
"[m] any EISs [proposed in Australia] are not scholarly works in the
sense that little reference is made to relevant previous work espe-
cially from refereed, published sources."2 1 0 Furthermore, "[m]uch
of the EIA literature still resounds with old and outmoded ideas
from the ecological literature of the 1970s and earlier."
2 1 1
Similar concerns are frequently raised with EISs prepared in the
United States, though the problems do not seem to be as serious as
those that arise in Australia. The CEQ regulations specifically pro-
mote scientific rigor2 12 and American agencies which fail to con-
sider relevant information are often forced to revise their
analyses.
2 13
753 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1985) (requiring preparation and consideration of EIS before
project approval); Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[T]he
appropriate time for preparing an EIS is prior to a decision, when the decisionmaker retains a
maximum range of options.") (emphasis in original); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 1979). While problems still occasionally arise in the U.S.
with agencies making decisions before the environmental analysis is complete, most agencies
recognize that such actions are extremely vulnerable if they are challenged in court, and few
are willing to risk that their actions will not be challenged.
210. Fairweather, supra note 185, at 142.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R § 1502.17 (1994) (requiring that the EIS list the names and qualifi-
cations of persons involved in preparing the EIS) and 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24 (1994) (requiring
that agencies "insure the professional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the discus-
sions and analyses in environmental impact statements").
213. See, e.g., the court's statement in Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers, 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983):
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A good illustration of the risks associated with poor data collec-
tion can be found in the Coronation Hill EIS which addressed pro-
posed mining operations in the conservation zone of what is now a
part of Kakadu National Park in the Northern Territory.214 The
conservation zone is unique for purposes of this study because it
was the subject of both an EIS, prepared by the proponent of a
gold, platinum, and palladium mine and an inquiry report pre-
pared by the Resource Assessment Commission. While one can ar-
gue that the EIS encompassed a smaller site - the proposed mine
at Coronation Hill - the conservation zone is itself a very small
area, encompassing only 47.5 square kilometers, all of which are
located in the upper basin of the South Alligator River. 215 Thus, a
thorough review of the cumulative impacts of mining operations in
the area proposed would almost certainly have included the entire
Conservation Zone and, perhaps, much more.216 Since an EIS is
supposed to consider the cumulative impacts of all past, present,
and future mining operations in the proposal area, it seems likely
that a well-conceived EIS would have addressed the entire conserva-
tion zone.
Of particular note is the wide divergence in the data regarding
species diversity as reported in the EIS and the inquiry report which
were prepared less than two years apart. The chart below describes
the differences.
217
If [the court] finds that the agency did not make a reasonably adequate compilation of
relevant information and that the EIS sets forth statements that are materially false or
inaccurate, [it] may properly find that the EIS does not satisfy the requirements of
NEPA, in that it cannot provide the basis for an informed evaluation or a reasoned
decision. Further, the court may properly be skeptical as to whether an EIS's conclu-
sions have a substantial basis in fact if the responsible agency has apparently ignored the
conflicting views of other agencies having pertinent expertise.
Id. at 1030. See also State of California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1982).
214. The controversial decision to include the Conservation Zone as part of the Kakadu
National Park is described in PAUL KELLY, THE END OF CERTAINTY- THE STORY OF THE 1980s
536-543 (1992).
215. See RESOURCE ASSESSMENT COMM'N, KAKADU CONSERVATION ZONE INQUIRY FINAL RE-
PORT § 1.06 (1991) [hereinafter KAKADu INQUIRY].
216. This is particularly true because the potential for mineral development in other parts
of the Zone was rated by the Bureau of Mineral Resources as "high." See iti. § 3.69.
217. Information taken from the Coronation Hill DEIS, supra note 171, at 3-19 to 3-24;
KAKADU INQUIRY, supra note 215, at 24-26.
19951
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw [Vol. 20:43
Conservation Zone
Type Inquiry Report Coronation Hill EIS







Aquatic Reptiles 7 4
Aquatic Invertebrates at least 110 at least 110
Marked as these differences are, it is not fair to conclude that the
draft EIS deliberately underrepresented the degree of species diver-
sity in the area. As suggested previously, the Coronation Hill EIS
focused on the "project area" and made no apparent effort to ad-
dress cumulative impacts, while the Kakadu inquiry report consid-
ered the entire conservation zone and plainly was concerned about
gathering data over the broader area. Whatever the explanation
for the difference, the wide discrepancy calls into question the cred-
ibility of the environmental assessment contained in the Corona-
tion Hill EIS. Furthermore, it serves to validate public skepticism
about the entire EIS process and the preparation of EIA documents
by project proponents, in particular.
218
7. The Public Inquiry
A distinctive feature of the Australia EIA system is its provision for
an inquiry in lieu of, or in addition to, an EIS. The basis upon
which an inquiry report is required is not stated in the statute, and
the process has been used sparingly, primarily in high profile cases.
Section 11(1) of the Impact Act 219 allows the Minister for the
Environment to "direct that an inquiry be conducted in respect of
all or any of the environmental aspects of a matter referred to in
any of the paragraphs of section 5, whether or not an environmen-
tal impact statement or public environment report has ... been
218. The apparent perception among many people in Australia is that the proponent-
prepared EIS is not worthy of public participation because the public can not trust the infor-
mation presented. Indeed, when I once explained to Phillip Toyne, the former Executive
Director of ACF, my interest in obtaining and reading copies of various EI~s he expressed
surprise. "Most people won't waste their time reviewing documents prepared by the propo-
nent of the project," he commented, "because they already know what the documents are
going to say." (Personal conversation with Phillip Toyne, Visiting Fellow, ANU, Canberra,
Australia, March, 1993).
219. No. 164, 1974 Austl. Acts 1843 (1974).
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furnished[.]" In addition, the Resource Assessment Commission
Act 1989 ("RAC") 220 establishes a Commission whose sole purpose
is to hold inquiries and make reports to the prime minister on spe-
cific resource use matters referred to it. Neither the Impact Act nor
the RAC Act contain specific guidelines for determining which mat-
ters should be the subject of an inquiry, 221 but the limited experi-
ence with inquiries suggests that they are reserved for large or
controversial projects or programs. Generally, the methods used
for assessing data and the procedures available for public involve-
ment in the inquiry process have greatly exceeded that of a typical
EIS. Indeed, detailed discussions of some of the analytical methods
used by the RAC have themselves been published and made avail-
able to the public in a series of research papers.222 Public processes
used in the Forest and Timber Inquiry included a series of meetings
with a broad array of interest groups as well as workshops to assist
the Commissioners and staff. In addition, the RAC convened pub-
lic hearings in which testimony was received from 323 individuals
and organizations on fifty separate dates in locations throughout
Australia. Finally, thirty-one consultants were hired by the RAC to
conduct research on various aspects of the inquiry. All of these re-
ports were made available to the public. A testament to RAC's suc-
cess in attracting public involvement is the fact that it received 543
written submissions in response to its draft report. The final report,
published in three paper-bound volumes, is well-organized and ac-
220. No. 94, 1989 Austl. Acts 2307 (1989).
221. Section 8 of the RAG Act, however, provides
In the performance of its functions in relation to a resource matter, the Commission
shall, as far as practicable and subject to the terms of the referral of the matter:
(a) identify the resource with which the matter is concerned and the extent of that
resource;
(b) identify the various uses that could be made of that resource;
(c) identify-
(i) the environmental, cultural, social, industry, economic and other values of
that resource or involved in those uses; and
(ii) the implications for those values of those uses, including implications that are
uncertain or long-term;
(d) assess the losses and benefits involved in the various alternative uses, or combina-
tions of uses, of that resource, including:
(i) losses and benefits of an unquantifiable nature; and
(ii) losses and benefits that are uncertain or long-term;
(e) give consideration to any other aspect of the matter that it considers relevant.
222. At the time of this writing, the RAC had published several research papers on analyti-
cal methods, such as the contingent valuation method for assessing costs. See, e.g., LEANNE C.
WINKS, A SURVEY OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD, RAC RsEARCH PAPER No. 2 (Nov.
1990) (on file with the author).
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cessible to the average lay reader. While such wide-ranging proce-
dures might not be necessary in all cases, the approach taken by the
Resource Assessment Commission might serve as a model for envi-
ronmental impact assessment of important resource and conserva-
tion issues.
Despite its advantages, the public inquiry process established
under the Impact Act in 1974 has been used for only four
projects. 223 This is unfortunate, particularly given the problems in-
herent in a system which otherwise relies so heavily on the propo-
nent to satisfy EIA requirements. Australia's system might be well-
served by procedures which establish standards for invoking the in-
quiry process. In particular, inquiries might be mandated when-
ever fundamental policy choices exist which may substantially affect
the environment.
The United States has no process comparable to Australia's in-
quiry process, nor does it share the British tradition of convening
inquiries to address matters of public concern. In the context of
EIA, the need for an inquiry process seems less urgent in the U.S.
than in Australia because private proponents do not prepare EISs
in the U.S. Nonetheless, the inquiry model might prove a useful
addition to current American EIA procedures, particularly in con-
junction with "programmatic" decisions.
Government agencies in the United States have long recognized
the desirability of preparing EISs to address broad, "programmatic"
activities. 224 For example, the United States Bureau of Land Man-
agement prepared a programmatic EIS to address its proposed fed-
eral coal leasing program.22 5 As with most programmatic decisions,
both of these proposals were extremely controversial, and both em-
223. The four Projects that have been the subject of inquiries under the Impact Act in-
clude the Fraser Island Environmental Inquiry (sand mining), the Environmental Inquiry on
Uranium Development in the Northern Territory (Ranger Uranium Mining project), the
Ulladulla Hinterland Broadcasting Transmission Station Inquiry, and the Shoalwater Bay
Area Inquiry (sand mining). CoMMoNwEA.mH ENV'T PROTECrION AGENCY, REvEw oF COM-
MONWEALTH ENV'T IMPACr ASSESSMENr Public Inquiry Process ii (1994). The Resource Assess-
ment Commission has completed three major inquiries on the prospects for mineral
development in the Kakadu Conservation Zone, Forest and Timber development throughout
Australia, and the Coastal Zone. Amid current budget problems, the government appears
likely to limit the RAC's funding to that money necessary to complete the Coastal Zone
Inquiry.
224. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(b) (1994) ("Environmental impact statements may be pre-
pared, and are sometimes required, for broad Federal actions such as the adoption of new
agency programs or regulations."). See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.4(c), 1508.18(b)(3) (1994).
225. Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Federal Coal Management Program,
44 Fed. Reg. 25,243 (1979).
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broiled the agencies in lengthy legal and political controversies. 226
Changes in administration during the course of these proposals ex-
acerbated the problem of concluding these actions.
While a thorough public inquiry into these issues would itself be
an expensive and lengthy undertaking, it seems unlikely that the
costs and time involved would have been as substantial as those in-
curred by the agencies in coming to grips with these matters. More-
over, since a public inquiry would be staffed and controlled largely
by persons outside the deciding agencies, those agencies could
more easily avoid the serious distractions from other important
work which are inevitable when an agency is considering important
policy questions.
D. Atmosphere of Neutrality
Public support for decisions involving public resources is impor-
tant in a democratic society. In recent years, environmental issues
have come to the forefront of electoral politics and, in some cases,
have helped to determine election outcomes.22 7 When handled
properly, EIA enhances the political process because it inspires
public confidence and builds public support for the chosen out-
come. When the public is not involved in the EIA process or when
the public lacks confidence in the documents produced during the
process, support can be lost. This would occur even in those cir-
cumstances when the public might objectively support a project on
its merits. 228 No issue is more likely to undermine public confi-
dence in the EIA process than the sense that it is biased. Unfortu-
nately, the perception of bias, whether real or imagined, is inherent
in the Australian EIA program and stems from the preparation of
the EIS by the project proponent.
Preparation of the EIS by a project proponent raises a number of
problems, many of which have already been noted. Most signifi-
cantly, however, it undermines public confidence by removing any
pretense that the evaluation of the proposed action will be objec-
tive. The point is not to criticize individual companies or individual
EISs. Many of these documents are no doubt as good as and per-
226. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982); National Wildlife Fed. v. Burford,
871 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1989).
227. See KELLY, supra note 214.
228. The Wesley Vale pulp mill proposed for Tasmania was a project which seems to have
been criticized as much for the way it was handled as for what the proponents were seeking
to do.
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haps better than those that might have been prepared by a team of
experts without ties to the proponent. The point is that most ra-
tional people will necessarily be highly skeptical about the objectiv-
ity of an EIS prepared by the project's proponent or its paid
consultant.
In the United States, under the CEQ rules, an EIS may not be
prepared by a private project proponent or any other person who
may have an interest, financial or otherwise, in the outcome of the
project.2 29 Instead, the EIS must be prepared by the agency respon-
sible for making the decision or, in some cases, by a disinterested
consultant hired by the agency.2 30 When the agency is the propo-
nent, it may prepare the EIS, though one might argue that the in-
herent conflicts associated, with preparation of EISs by private
proponents are equally relevant here. Certainly situations exist
when neutrality can only be achieved if the EIS is prepared by a
third party. In this situation, the public inquiry mechanism estab-
lished under the Impact Act seems an excellent option. But, in
most cases, the conflicts facing the agency proponent are far less
significant than those facing a private proponent. In particular, un-
like the private proponent, the agency proponent has no financial
stake in the outcome. To be sure, agency proponents are often
viewed as having a preconceived "agenda" that is expected to influ-
ence the outcome. However, as agencies develop the kind of inter-
disciplinary expertise necessary to assure a proper environmental
analysis, this bias is significantly reduced. Moreover, forcing gov-
ernment agencies to prepare their own EISs does more than simply
remove the appearance of bias. Over time, it actually appears to
transform the agency to one that is able to truly integrate environ-
mental concerns into its program. 23' This kind of transformation
229. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(c) (1994).
230. Id.
231. In the United States, for example, the U.S. Forest Service appears to be in the throes
of a fairly radical transformation in its approach toward resource management. Tradition-
ally, the agency was staffed with experts in producing timber, and for many years the agency
focused on this as a primary goal. As the public (and the courts) began to demand better
environmental analyses of their timber sales and other actions, the agency was forced to
employ persons with backgrounds in biology, ecology, wildlife management, and soil protec-
tion. The people who came into the agency with these backgrounds were far less sympathetic
to the logging industry than their predecessors. Gradually, these people have begun to work
their way into management positions. Over the next decade, as this trend increases, the
Forest Service seems likely to further shift its focus away from logging and toward activities
that are less harmful from an environmental perspective. This dramatic change in the
agency has come about, in large measure, because of NEPA and the agency's obligation
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in the way agencies view their mission might not happen over night,
but it will not happen at all if agencies are relegated to a role on the
sidelines of the EIA process.
While the American approach seems much more likely to pro-
mote neutrality toward outcomes than the Australian system, it is
far from perfect. Indeed, the CEQ rules expressly authorize prepa-
ration of environmental assessments by private proponents, so long
as the responsible agency "make [s] its own evaluation of the envi-
ronmental issues and take[s] responsibility for the scope and con-
tent of the environmental assessment."232 If conflicts of interest
pose a problem in an EIS context, they pose no less of a problem in
the context of EA preparation which, after all, is the vehicle for
preparing the alternatives analysis required by § 102(2) (E) of
NEPA. Most agencies, however, seem inclined to prepare their own
EAs, in part, because the public has been sensitized to, and com-
plains about, the potential for conflicts of interest and, in part, be-
cause the agency typically has adequate expertise to perform the
task with a reasonable level of efficiency.
E. Public Participation
Done properly, environmental assessment is difficult and expen-
sive. Thus, if a project proponent is certain that a proposed project
will not invite substantial public scrutiny or, alternatively, that pub-
lic comments will not be taken seriously, it can be reasonably secure
in cutting corners to save time and money.235 This basic fact of
human nature leads to an important corollary. Over time, the qual-
ity of environmental assessment is directly proportional to the
amount and quality of the public scrutiny that a project proponent
expects will be accorded a project and the extent to which the pro-
ponent believes that public comments will influence the action
agency or a reviewing body. Thus, public participation is essential
to the successful operation of the EIA process.
under NEPA to take an interdisciplinary approach toward EIA. Despite the progress that the
Forest Service has made, the transformation suggested above is far from complete, and many
problems with the agency's implementation of NEPA remain. See Stark Ackerman, Observa-
tions on the Transformation of the Forest Service: The Effects of the National Environmental Policy Act
on U.S. Forest Service Decision Making, 20 E ,rL. L. 703 (1990).
232. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(b) (1994).
233. This appears to have been a serious problem with respect to the EIA process for the
McArthur River lead and zinc mine. Freya Dawson, A Major Mining Project is Fast Tracked in the
Northern Territory, but at What Cost?, 30 IMPACt 6, 9-10 (1993).
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The public has become interested in projects that may adversely
affect the environment. As public interest has increased, so too
have demands for processes that involve the public. When properly
conducted, EIA is an ideal vehicle for involving the public in impor-
tant decisions that may affect the environment because it provides
the public with a clear statement of the policy choices that are avail-
able to decision makers.23 4 When EIA is conducted poorly, how-
ever, public participation may serve, mainly, to highlight the
weaknesses in the process and lead to frustration on all sides. Many
factors influence the success of public participation in EIA. Not the
least of these is the preparation of a technically sound document as
described above. Just as importantly, however, is assuring that the
public's participation in the process is meaningful. That is, the
public must be capable of influencing the policy choices that are to
be made. Meaningful participation requires attention to several
things. First, the people must believe that their comments can in-
fluence the decision. People who believe that the EIA process is a
sham to justify a decision that has already been made will not be
inclined to participate. Preparation of the EIS by the proponent or
the proponent's consultant makes it very difficult and perhaps im-
possible to convince the public that their participation is meaning-
ful.2 35 But even if private proponents continue to prepare EISs in
Australia, much more can be done to involve the public in a mean-
ingful way. For example, instead of asking the project proponent to
solicit and respond to comments, as is the current practice, the ac-
tion agency might assume that responsibility. It is, after all, the
agency's decision which is at issue, and the focus of the comments
ought to be on how the decision should be made. To further en-
hance the public's sense of involvement, the agency should con-
sider preparing and distributing before the close of the public
comment period an initial evaluation of the draft EIS. This would
allow the public an opportunity to review and consider the agency's
concerns with the draft document and to provide comments as to
whether the agency's initial evaluation adequately address the pub-
lic's concerns.
Second, the public must be involved early in the EIA process.
Public participation which begins, and too often ends, at the draft
EIS stage is unlikely to be meaningful. By the time that the draft
234. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1994).
235. Id. § 1505.
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EIS is prepared, key decisions have already been made regarding
the issues that will be addressed and the alternatives that will be
considered. An EIS which may be scientifically unassailable may,
nonetheless, be of little value if the issues that it addresses are not
truly relevant to the policy choices that are available to the decision
maker. A public "scoping" process, as previously described, will
help ensure that the issues addressed in an EIS are relevant.2
6
Third, the persons involved in EIS preparation must be proactive
towards the public so as to ensure they are competent to participate
in a meaningful way.2 3 7 Persons legitimately interested in the po-
tential impacts from a proposed action may, nonetheless, lack suffi-
cient expertise to participate in the process in a meaningful way.
Assisting these persons in gaining the necessary expertise is critical
to public involvement. Such assistance can take several forms. Ob-
viously, funds can be provided to allow the interested persons to
hire experts to review the documents for them. While this method
might help to define the issues of public concern, it will probably
be less meaningful than involving the interested persons more di-
rectly. Workshops can be held and public meetings scheduled to
help educate the public about the project.238
One of the most innovative approaches to public involvement in
the EIA process is the use of a consultative committee - an idea
pioneered by the State of Victoria. For most of the environmental
effects statements ("EES") prepared in Victoria since mid-1990, the
Minister for Planning and Housing has appointed a consultative
committee to guide EES preparation. 239 According to Victoria's
EIA guidelines "[t]he committee's membership includes the rele-
vant Government agencies, local government and community
236. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
237. The CEQ regulations require agencies to "affirmatively solicit[ ] comments from
those persons or organizations who may be interested or affected." 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (a) (4)
(1994). See also 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (1994).
238. The preparer should recognize, however, that persons who are legitimately interested
in a project may nonetheless lack the time or ability to fully understand the dimensions and
potential impacts of a proposal. Thus, the preparer must be flexible toward the public, pro-
viding educational opportunities and enlisting competent participants, while being prepared
to provide other assistance where necessary to ensure that the views represented by signifi-
cant segments of the public are fully developed.
239. See Envtl. Assessment Branch, Dep't of Planning and Development, Seminar Notes 8
(April 2, 1993) (participant's guide for an Environmental Impact seminar held in Mel-
bourne, Australia) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Seminar Notes]. See also Guidelines,
supra note 187, at 6 ("When an EES is required, the Minister for Planning and Housing
usually establishes a Consultative Committee to guide the preparation of the EES.").
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groups as well as the proponent."240 The committee's principal
function is to drive EES preparation from the public scoping phase
until its completion and to help insure that all relevant matters are
fully and fairly addressed in the EES.2 41 While the composition of
the consultative committee may pose difficulties, it offers interested
parties a more concrete role in the process than does the typical
public comment process. It also helps to insure that the participa-
tion of all interested parties is both meaningful and relevant to the
particular concerns raised by the proposed action. These reasons
help to explain why Victoria's experience with the process has been
favorable.2
42
A telling commentary regarding the failure of the public partici-
pation process at the Commonwealth level in Australia is found in
the Final EIS for the proposed Coronation Hill mine. The Final
EIS, among other things, responded to the public comments that
were received. One hundred and sixty-three persons submitted
comments which, according to the authors of the EIS, were "not
germane to the Coronation Hill mine."2 43 For example, many peo-
ple apparently thought that Coronation Hill would be a uranium
mine. In fact, it was planned as a gold, platinum, and palladium
mine. Others thought that the proposed mine would destroy
rainforest habitat. In fact, however, there is no rainforest in the
vicinity of the proposed mine.
24 4
If one wants to be cynical about EIA, these irrelevant public com-
ments might be used as evidence that much of the public is incapa-
ble of meaningful participation. Indeed, one can almost sense the
feelings of frustration on the part of the EIS authors. If one were
proactive and interested in promoting EIA, however, one would al-
most certainly conclude that the authors of the Coronation Hill EIS
had failed in their efforts to involve the public in the EIA process in
any meaningful way. In this case, involvement may have required
educational programs, hearings, workshops, press releases, and,
perhaps, paid advertisements in local and regional newspapers
before the public was asked to provide comments.2 45 A request for
240. Guidelines, supra note 187, at 6.
241. See Seminar Notes, supra note 239, at 8.
242. Id. See also Interview with Robin Saunders, Director, Environmental Assessment
Branch, Dep't of Planning and Housing (Sept. 23, 1993). (confirming this conclusion).
243. Coronation Hill DEIS, supra note 171, at 16.
244. I& at 16-19.
245. The proponents of the proposed Wesley Vale kraft pulp mill took out a four page
newspaper advertisement in the Tasmanian newspapers to help explain (and not incidentally
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public comments might have included a one or two page summary
of the project with information about where the public could ob-
tain more information.246 Alternately, the consultative committee
concept described above might have been used as a means to pro-
mote relevant public participation.
Fourth, the EIA process must be as open as possible. This means
that all documents which form the basis for any part of the EIS are
referenced and readily available to the public, 247 that persons in-
volved in writing the EIS are available to the public to explain por-
tions of documents or studies which may be unclear, and that
significant comments offered by the public are addressed before a
decision is made. In the United States, the CEQ regulations pro-
mote public rights such as these.248 In Australia, however, public
rights to participate in the EIA process seem, at best, to be toler-
ated. With the important exception of the consultative committee
in Victoria, no clear effort exists to promote public involvement in
the process.
support) their project. See, e.g., A Special Report: Export Pulp Mill PArjec, THE ADVOCATE, May
7, 1988, at 11-14. The company's advertisement was certainly useful in providing the public
with basic information about the proposed project, and likely helped to avoid misconcep-
tions about the project held by some members of the public. Still, an ad which was devel-
oped by and paid for by the project proponent ought not be the sole or even principal means
that the public has to get access to basic information about a proposal. Understandably,
many people believe that such information is unfairly biased towards the outcome sought by
the proponent.
246. Victoria frequently prepares summary'brochures to describe proposed actions. This
can be a useful tool for informing the public about the parameters of the debate on a pro-
posed action without overloading a person with information. Adoption of such a practice
should be considered in other jurisdictions in both the United States and Australia.
247. Ralf Buckley has suggested that, in fact, referenced documents are often unavailable
and that companies often claim that the information is proprietary to avoid releasing it to the
public. If these claims are true, they greatly undermine public confidence in the EIA process
and discourage the public from being involved. Ralf C. Buckley, Adequacy of Current Legislative
and Institutional Frameworks for Environmental Impact Audit in Australia, 7 ENvr'L & PLAN. LJ.
144 (1991).
248. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(f) (1994) which provides that
Agencies shall:
(f) Make environmental impact statements, the comments received, and any underly-
ing documents available to the public pursuant to the provisions of the Freedom of
Information Act .... Materials to be made available to the public shall be provided to
the public without charge to the extent practicable, or at a fee which is not more than
the actual costs of reproducing copies ....
See also 40 C.F.R. § 1501. 7(a)(1) (1994) (encouraging broad participation in the scoping
process); 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6 (1994) (promoting public involvement in EIA processes);.40
C.F.R. § 1506,10 (1994) (generally precluding agency decisions until a minimum of 30 days
after the final EIS has been released).
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Moreover, while public access to environmental impact state-
ments in Australia is, theoretically, good, as a practical matter, it is
often difficult to locate documents.2 49 Furthermore, although the
fees charged for EISs in Australia are generally modest, the com-
mon practice of charging a fee for an EIS surely limits their distri-
bution substantially and discourages many people from conducting
a thorough review of the project in advance of submitting their
comments. Charging fees is hardly a proactive step towards involv-
ing the public. Indeed, the amount of money which is likely to be
generated through this process seems hardly sufficient to justify its
use, particularly when viewed in the context of the cost of the over-
all project.
With a few exceptions, meaningful public involvement in the EIA
process-involvement that is capable of influencing decisions-
does not seem to reflect Australia's experience with EIA. Perhaps
the best evidence of this fact is that final EISs are viewed as mere
appendages of the draft documents. Nothing of significance seems
to change between the draft and final documents, and the final
document is used to respond to public comments and address nu-
ances with the project that have developed since the Draft EIS was
presented to the public.2 5 0 Indeed, in some cases, as in the case of
the proposed pulp mill at Wesley Vale, draft and final EISs are not
even prepared.
2 5 1
With the familiar pattern in Australia of relegating the final EIS
to the role of an addendum or appendage to the draft document,
249. See supra note 202.
250. See, e.g., Coronation Hill Final EIS (on file with the author). This stands in marked
contrast with the EIS process in the United States. The final EIS is almost always a much
more thorough document when compared with the draft, and frequently addresses issues
and problems that were not considered in the draft. Significant changes in the decision as
originally proposed are also commonplace. It would be misleading to suggest that EIA in the
United States results in abandoning a large number of proposals. This is certainly not the
case, though some projects are indeed, scrapped as a result of the process. Most often, pro-
posals go forward in a somewhat changed form after the EIS process has been completed.
251. One should be careful here to distinguish between meaningful public participation
capable of influencing a decision, from changes in government positions which are subject to
political influence. Both the Coronation Hill mine and the Wesley Vale pulp mill were ulti-
mately abandoned, in the former case by the government and in the latter case by the com-
pany which was unwilling to accept the strict pollution standards proposed by the
government. In neither case, however, did public involvement in the EIA process significantly
influence the decision. On the contrary, the final EIS in both cases proposed essentially what
the companies wanted to do.
Environmental Impact Assessment in Australia
the Australian system seems to lessen the opportunity for effecting a
significant change in the project as originally proposed.
25 2
F. Standards to Guide the Decision
A common complaint about EIA from the business community is
the lengthy delays sometimes caused by EIS development and re-
view processes. As noted previously, some aspects of EIA, such as
the collection of baseline data, take time - at least a year and often
longer. But with advance planning, unreasonable delays caused by
data collection requirements can be avoided.253 Another poten-
tially significant source of delay in Australia, however, involves gov-
ernment failure to adopt clear substantive standards that will guide
the agency's decision on particular types of actions.
The proposed kraft pulp mill at Wesley Vale in Tasmania offers a
good illustration of the problem that this engenders. The propo-
nent of the project, North Broken Hill, first met with officials from
the Commonwealth government to outline its plan for the pro-
posed mill in February, 1988. The EIS for the proposed mill was
released to the public 8 months later in October, 1988. Only then
did the Tasmanian government begin the process of determining
what environmental controls and guidelines it would impose on the
facility. What followed, of course, was a series of political machina-
tions which eventually led to a new set of federal standards and
guidelines. In the face of these new standards, the company with-
drew its proposal.2
54
252. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Schedule promulgated under the
Impact Act authorizes a minimum comment period ofjust 28 days. Schedule, supra note 137,
§ 6.3.1(d). In the United States, the minimum comment period on an EIS is 45 days. 40
C.F.R. § 1506.10(c) (1994).
253. One critic has noted, for example, a case where "the engineering aspects of [a] pro-
ject were under study for three years before two months of excellent biological assessment
was undertaken." Fairweather, supra note 185.
254. In a December 1988 speech to the International Environmental Forum in Washing-
ton, D.C., Senator Graham Richardson, Australia's Minister for the Arts, Sport, the Environ-
ment, Tourism and Territories, signaled Australia's commitment to strict environmental
standards for the Wesley Vale project by saying
Recently during the very public debate [over the Wesley Vale project], it came to my
attention that a Noranda executive had expressed the view that investing in Australia
seemed an attractive proposition as our environmental laws were less stringent than in
his home country, Canada. This is as good a place as any to signal that the executive's
view was badly mistaken.
Senator Graham Richardson, Address at the International Environment Forum (December
13, 1988) (Forum held at the Westin Hotel, Washington, D.C.). After the Australian Govern-
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Whether or not the federal guidelines were justified, the com-
pany should not have had to wait until the 11th hour to find out
what those standards would be. Indeed, the basic standards which
would apply to the mill should have been made clear to the public
at least by the time of the EIS, though preferably much earlier, so
that those standards, themselves, could have been the subject of
public comment. Minor deviations from general standards will
often be necessary to address particular issues of concern. How-
ever, basic government policy choices about how pollution stan-
dards will be set should not be made ad hoc. If the government
intends to impose some form of "best technology" approach to
pulp mills, then policy decisions must be made in advance of the
decision on the particular mill so that the regulated community un-
derstands how their proposal will be evaluated.
In the United States, federal pollution standards tend to be set
well in advance because of detailed requirements contained in stat-
utes such as the U.S. Clean Air Act255 and the U.S. Clean Water
Act.256 For many reasons, the federal government of Australia has
not enacted comprehensive pollution control legislation, and it is,
therefore, not surprising that general federal pollution standards
have not been set in advance. But if the government is interested in
"fast-tracking" projects, it must remove all uncertainty as quickly as
possible regarding the basic standards it intends to require for a
proposed facility. These standards should, preferably, be adopted
following public consultation, as, for example, in a public rule-mak-
ing process. There is little need to await the completion of the EIS
process. Such delays in setting basic standards makes it difficult for
the company to assess its costs in a timely fashion. It also increases
the likelihood that the decision with respect to standards will be
politicized in a way that may adversely affect the reputations and
relationships among the various parties involved.
At the time of this writing, the Australian Parliament was about to
consider proposed legislation that would establish a National Envi-
ronmental Protection Authority with the power to set national am-
bient air and water quality standards.2 5 7 Unfortunately, the
proposed legislation would not provide authority for setting na-
ment made good on its commitment to set strict environmental standards for the Wesley Vale
project, the company ultimately decided to withdraw its proposal.
255. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410-7671 (1988).
256. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
257. See National Environment Protection Bill, § 12 (1993) (on file with the author).
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tional standards for categories or classes of facilities, and, thus, the
proposed legislation will not solve the problem identified above.258
Indeed, the American experience with ambient air quality stan-
dards under the U.S. Clean Air Act suggests that such standards are
an ineffective, and, ultimately, an inefficient means for addressing
pollution problems.
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G. A Reasoned Choice
Most observers agree that the primary focus of EIA is proce-
dural.260 It is intended primarily to provide a framework whereby
better-reasoned government decisions can be made. No doubt,
part of the reason that EIA has gained international acceptance re-
lates to the fact that it does not typically tie a government agency's
hands. The flexibility inherent in the EIA process is necessary be-
cause environmental considerations are only one of many factors
that must be considered in making a decision. However, there is a
difference between flexibility and carte blanche.
In both Australia and the United States, legal authority exists to
overturn agency decisions that are capricious or that result from an
abuse of discretion.261 Surprisingly, however, no American court
has ever overturned an agency's decision based only upon informa-
tion contained in EIA documents.262 Perhaps the appropriate case
has not yet reached the courts, but if that case should appear, it is
critically important that the court strike down the decision. The
rules established in both countries should better recognize this pos-
sibility. It would be tragic if a government agency were allowed to
258. The proposed legislation also promotes the troublesome trend in Commonwealth
environmental legislation away from enforceable standards. The proposed law provides for
the establishment of "national environment protection measures" which might include "stan-
dards," "goals," "guidelines," and "protocols," none of which appear to be enforceable. Id.
§ 12.
259. See MARK SQurLAcE, E rmovmTrrAt L w, VOL. 3: Am POLLUTnON 105-107 (2d ed.
1992) (describing the repeated failures of states to achieve the ambient air quality standards
by the deadlines established by Congress).
260. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (saying that NEPA's mandate to the agencies is mainly
procedural).
261. Compare the United States Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (a)
(1992) with the ADJR Act §§ 5-7.
262. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has acknowledged the possibility. Baltimore Gas
& Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983). Furthermore,
a few courts have suggested that they might have overturned decisions on grounds of capri-
ciousness had other bases for relief been unavailable. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Watt, 716
F.2d 946, 953 (1st Cir. 1983); Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 983 (5th Cir. 1983).
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proceed with an action in the face of an EIS that clearly demon-
strated the folly of the action even when taking into account the
non-environmental aspects of the action agency's mandate.263
H. Mitigation Measures
World-wide acceptance of EIA as an appropriate tool for deci-
sion-making has been possible, at least in part, because it does not
dictate outcomes. Rather, it has evolved essentially as a process for
helping government agencies better understand the ramifications
of their decisions. The limited focus of EIA makes it much less
threatening to decision-making authorities and has helped garner
acceptance and support for the process. EIA has now matured, at
least in some countries, to the point that governments ought to
consider affording it a more substantive role.2 64 A logical starting
point for this extension is in the area of mitigation. It is generally
accepted that appropriate mitigation measures must be discussed in
an EIA document,265 and it is commonplace for the agencies to
condition their decisions on the adoption of such measures. In
263. In deciding how environmental impacts should influence a decision on a proposed
action, both Australia and the United States might benefit from considering an approach
taken under Canada's EIA law. That law expressly precludes agencies from taking actions
that would permit a project to be carried out when the project is "likely to cause significant
adverse effects that cannot be justified .... ." An Act to establish a federal environmental
assessment process, Ch. 37, 40-41 Eliz. II, Vol. 1, 1992 S.C. 937, § 20(1)(b) (1992). While this
standard may be no less deferential than the "arbitrary and capricious" and "reasonableness"
standards of American and Australian law, Canada goes a step further and requires referral
of cases to a mediator or a review panel where (1) uncertainties exist as to whether a project
is likely to cause significant adverse effects, (2) the agency believes a project is justified even
though it is likely to cause significant adverse effects, or (3) public concerns warrant such a
referral. Id. § 20(1)(c); see also id. § 29.
264. In theory, substantive judicial review of government decisions following an EIA pro-
cess is available in both the United States and Australia. In the U.S., federal courts may
review agency actions under the deferential "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of discre-
tion" standard. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1992). See also Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1983). In Australia, the
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act affords an equally deferential standard, al-
lowing reversal of an agency decision where it is "so unreasonable that no reasonable person
could have so exercised the power." ADJR Act § 5(2) (g). In practice, however, no court in
either jurisdiction has ever overturned a decision on the grounds that the EIA document
warranted a different result than that reached by the agency.
265. Compare the Council of Environmental Quality regulations at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 1502.14(f), 1505.3, 1508.25(b) (3) (1993) with the Schedule issued under the Impact Act,
§ 4.1(j). In contrast to American and Australian law, Canadian law expressly requires federal
agencies to "ensure that any mitigation measures that the responsible authority considers
appropriate are implemented." An Act to establish a federal environmental assessment pro-
cess, Ch. 37, 40-41 Eliz. II. Vol. I, 1992 S.C. 937, § 20(1)(a) (1992). See also id. § 20(2).
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some cases, however, an agency may lack the information necessary
to predict impacts with sufficient certainty to know what mitigation
measures are appropriate. In other cases, an agency may prefer to
presume that the person who will carry out the action will adopt
appropriate mitigation without so conditioning its approval of the
action.
Should an agency be required to impose reasonable mitigation
measures or, in the case when it lacks adequate information, retain
the authority to impose mitigation as necessary to accomplish speci-
fied environmental goals? While the U.S. Supreme Court has an-
swered this question in the negative, 266 the issue has not yet been
squarely confronted in Australia. Perhaps it is time, however, for
governments to recognize that reasonable mitigation of environ-
mental impacts is the sine qua non of agency approval. When an
agency must decide whether to approve a proposed action, rea-
soned decision-making requires that it know the extent to which
environmental impacts will be mitigated. If it does not know the
extent of mitigation, it cannot possibly weigh the costs and benefits
of the proposed action and the alternatives.
To be sure, agencies should retain broad discretion to decide
what constitutes reasonable mitigation. But agencies ought not be
allowed to defer a substantive decision about mitigation until after a
decision has been made.
I. Opportunity for Review
There is much to criticize about the overly-litigious nature of the
American system of judicial review. 267 However, the mere possibil-
ity of judicial review has probably done more for improving the
quality of the EIA process than any other single factor. There are
several reasons for this. First, agencies are aware that the federal
courts may be asked to judge the adequacy of their documents.
EISs which are found to be inadequate by a court embarrass agen-
cies and seriously undermine their ability to accomplish their mis-
sion by introducing delays and other problems into their agendas.
As Justice Stein has noted: "The ready availability of a remedy helps
keep government authorities on their toes. It ensures that there is
266. Robertson v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 332, 353 n.16 (1989).
267. During 1990, the most recent year for which figures are available, 85 lawsuits were
filed against federal departments and agencies on the basis of NEPA. 22 COUNCIL ENVrL
QuAm ANN. REP. 141 (1992). Although statistics are not kept, many other administrative
cases involving NEPA claims were likely filed as well.
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a public watchdog on regulatory authorities to ensure that they do
not fall asleep on the job."26a
Second, win, lose, or draw, agencies learn a great deal about the
EIA process from litigation. Lawyers become involved and help citi-
zen groups to articulate legal issues in a way that is often clearer to
the agencies than it was during the EIA process. Indeed, agency
behavior in future EIA proceedings often changes to avoid the
problems identified in a lawsuit well in advance of the decision in
the case. When decisions are finally made by a court, they help to
educate both the agency and the public about the role of EIA in
government decision-making.
The prospect ofjudicial review imposes on federal agencies a cor-
responding obligation to keep a complete and accurate administra-
tive record, including documents, studies, comments and
authorities relevant to the decision. In the United States, judicial
review of administrative action is almost always on the basis of the
administrative record that was before the agency at the time of the
decision. While testimony in NEPA cases is not uncommon, it gen-
erally goes to explain the record that was before the agency at the
time the decision was made. New materials that were not available
to the public and were not part of the record cannot be brought in
tojustify the agency's decision. 269 To be sure, the quality of admin-
istrative records varies among agencies. However, the fact that
agencies are aware of the need to maintain complete and well-or-
ganized administrative records has greatly aided the process of in-
volving the public in EIA.
A variety of factors have combined to hamper judicial review of
EIA in Australia, particularly at the federal level. These are de-
scribed above in the section on administrative law. One simple way
around most of these problems, which would provide most of the
salutary benefits of judicial review, would be to make review avail-
able to any interested person in the Administrative Appeals Tribu-
nal or some other, perhaps less formal, administrative forum.
Judicial review from the tribunal's decision might also be made
268. Justice Paul Stein, Can Review Bodies Lead to Better Decision-Making?, 66 CANBERRA BULL.
PUB. ADMiN. 118, 119 (1991).
269. A lawyer for the U.S. Department of Agriculture tells Forest Service employees during
training sessions that if some event, comment, study, or article is not documented in the
administrative record then "it didn't happen" as far as the court is concerned. An important
corollary to this rule: if you can't find the relevant document, "it didn't happen." Charles
Lennahan, Comments at the Threatened and Endangered Species Workshop (Feb. 1990)
(workshop sponsored by the Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C.).
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available, but review in such cases could be restricted to the record.
Another good model is that chosen by New South Wales and, more
recently, by Queensland and South Australia. These states have
adopted specialist courts to handle environmental matters. In par-
ticular, the New South Wales Land and Environment Court has,
over time, developed a strong reputation as an innovative, produc-
tive and efficient means for addressing environmental disputes.
2 70
The opportunity for review goes a long way toward empowering
the public, thereby increasing their interest and involvement in
EIA. Processes that will promote public involvement are not free.
Over time, however, the quality of EIA will improve immeasurably
as the public, the government agencies, and the regulated commu-
nity begin to understand their respective roles in the EIA process.
J. Post-EIS Audit
Even when the EIA process is managed well, it is inevitable that
some of the predictions regarding environmental impacts that are
made in the environmental document will be wrong. Generally,
however, no effort is made to acknowledge inaccurate predictions,
to understand why they were made, or to take appropriate correc-
tive action in light of the new information. 271 The advantages of a
post-EIS audit seem obvious. By acknowledging inaccurate predic-
tions and attempting to understand why they were made, agencies
can expect to learn from past mistakes and improve the accuracy of
future documents. Furthermore, while an agency's options are
more limited once a proposed action has been approved, the
agency can retain some discretion to require further mitigation of
adverse impacts (or perhaps to eliminate unnecessary mitigation re-
quirements) whenever predicted impacts are in error.
Although government agencies sometimes perform post-deci-
sional monitoring of approved actions following an EIA process,
the practice is far from uniform or routine. Furthermore, while
monitoring may be'an important part of an audit process, it may
fall short of providing adequate information to an agency about the
success of the EIA process, if the agency fails to relate the informa-
tion acquired during monitoring to the predictions made in the
environmental document.
270. SeeJ.S. Cripps, Administrative Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND LEGAL CHANGE,
supra note 20.
271. See generally Barry Sadler, The Evaluation of Assessment: Post-EIS Research and Process De-
velopment, in ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACr ASSESSMENT, supra note 133.
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As between Australia and the United States, Australian govern-
ments appear to have more clearly recognized the need for a post-
EIA audit.272 Indeed, the administrative procedures adopted pur-
suant to the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act ex-
pressly provide for the review and assessment of "the effectiveness
of any safeguards or standards for the protection of the environ-
ment adopted or applied in respect of the proposed action and the
accuracy of any forecasts of the environmental effects of the pro-
posed action."273 By contrast, the CEQ regulations are notable for
their utter failure to address post-EIS activities. While the rules do
encourage monitoring "in important cases . . . to assure that
[agency] decisions are carried oUt," 274 they do not discuss monitor-
ing in the broader context of assessing the accuracy of the EIA
document.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Many recommendations and suggestions have been made
throughout the body of this paper. Set forth below is a brief sum-
mary of some of the key recommendations and the reasons for
them.
A. Australia
The overwhelming impression from this study is that Australian
governments do not believe in EIA - at least not in the way that it
was originally conceived. The fundamental purpose of EIA is to aid
in the government's decision-making process. A host of problems
with the implementation of EIA in Australia, however, results in the
application of EIA after the key decisions have already been made.
This means that EIA is relegated to the relatively insignificant role
of offering information about how to mitigate the environmental
impacts from a specific project which has been proposed. The Mc-
Arthur River mine is the most obvious example of this problem, but
it is hardly an isolated example.
A number of changes to the Australian EIA process might help to
restore its basic purpose. First, the Commonwealth should adopt
272. Ralf Buckley suggests that most jurisdictions in Australia are moving toward EIA au-
diting, though Victoria and New South Wales appear to have made the most progress. Ralf
C. Buckley, Adequacy of Current Legislative and Institutional Frameworks for Environmental Impact
Audit in Australia, 7 ENvTL. & PLAN. L.J. 142, 145 (1990).
273. Schedule, supra note 137, § 10.1.1. See also id. §§ 10.1.2, 10.1.3.
274. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3 (1994).
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clear, comprehensive, and enforceable standards to govern EIA.
Ideally, these standards might be adopted jointly by all affected
states and territories as well as the Commonwealth. Second, Austra-
lia must confront the problems associated with having the propo-
nent prepare the key EIA documents. Although Australian
governments are understandably concerned about having to bear
the substantial costs associated with preparing EIA documents,
there is no reason why the private project proponents should not
bear those costs, just as they do now.2 75 While agencies might ini-
tially turn to the same consultants used by industry to prepare EIA
documents, the difference in their approach to EIA should be enor-
mous. Freed of the risk of losing clients by failing to prepare a
"favorable" report, a consultant can, with the agency's help and en-
couragement, better strive for objectivity and broad consideration
of all reasonable alternatives to a proposed action.
As Australia considers a transition to agency-prepared EIA docu-
ments, several changes could be made to the current procedure
that would help to alleviate some of the worst problems associated
with proponent-prepared EIA documents. These include (1) intro-
ducing mandatory public scoping processes to help assure early ap-
plication of EIA, (2) better focusing on the alternatives analysis,
including perhaps affording the action agency the right to deter-
mine at the conclusion of the scoping process, the range of alterna-
tives which must be considered in the EIA document, (3) providing
for public comment submissions to the action agency rather than
the proponent, with consideration of public comments by the ac-
tion agency in a preliminary evaluation of the draft EIA document,
and (4) more frequent use of the public inquiry process, perhaps
using the Resource Assessment Commission as the vehicle for carry-
ing out assessments, in cases where an independent evaluation
would be most valuable.
Finally, Australian EIA processes should afford some better mech-
anism for independent review of EIA compliance. While the system
adopted by New South Wales offers a useful model, significant
problems remain with respect to payment of costs. It may be that a
system of review that is wholly outside the judicial process would
best serve the purposes of successful EIA implementation. One of
the key reasons for providing review is to empower the public so
275. Cost-recovering for preparing NEPA documents on private projects is authorized in
the United States but has not yet taken hold to any substantial degree.
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that it will want to be involved in helping the government to make
EIA work. However, review will also serve as a check on the EIA
process that is indispensable to its proper maturation.
276
B. United States
While the system of EIA has matured beyond the stage where it
now exists in Australia, the United States has many remaining EIA
problems to resolve. Ironically, American courts seem poised to
further restrict public access to the courts, access that has been in-
strumental in NEPA's development, just as Australian courts show
signs of opening their doors more widely. Among the most serious
American EIA problems is preparation of EISs for broad projects or
programs. It is often these projects which would benefit most from
a fresh look. Yet too often it is these same projects where agencies
have trouble breaking out of their preconceived, often traditional,
ways of doing business. The public inquiry process provided for
under Australia's laws offers a useful model for American agencies
that are interested in breaking out of their traditional modes of
operation. A statutory change to provide for inquiries is probably
unnecessary, but the CEQ should consider amending the NEPA
rules to establish procedures for using a public inquiry in appropri-
ate cases.
The United States should also follow Australia's lead in recogniz-
ing the value of the post-EIA audit as a vehicle for improving the
accuracy of environmental documents and for fine-tuning actions
which have already been approved.,
As the environmental crisis deepens and more and more people
compete for smaller and smaller quantities of the Earth's resources,
better government decisions will become critical.2 77 And, better de-
276. Many of the ideas proposed in this article are now under active consideration by the
Commonwealth EPA as it considers various options for reforming the Impact Act. See COM-
MONWEALTH ENV'T PROTECTION AGENCY, PuBLic REVIEW OF THE COMMONWEALTH ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACr AssEssMENT PROCESS Main Discussion Paper 49-50 (Nov. 1994) (on file with the
author). Among the more promising proposals include: (1) promulgating a schedule of
designated developments which would trigger the EIS requirement (Option 2), (2) introduc-
ing a public scoping process into the EIA process (Option 10), (3) introducing post-assess-
ment monitoring as a standard element of the EIA process (Option 22), (4) eliminating
standing requirements for persons seeking judicial review of decisions made under the Im-
pact Act (Option 26), and (5) providing that decisions made under the Impact Act be subject
to review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. Unfortunately, the Commonwealth ap-
pears to remain committed to having project proponents prepare EISs (Option 15).
277. Bad government decisions are not merely a legacy of our past; they remain a signifi-
cant problem today. Recent newspaper accounts of the decisions that have allowed the
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cisions can best be assured by putting into place sound decision-
making processes that will serve the local, regional, and global com-
munities well into the twenty-first century. As two well-developed
countries, the United States and Australia have a special responsi-
bility to provide models of good decision-making processes that can
be adapted for use by other nations. This comparative study offers
ideas for improving both the Australian and American models with
the hope that these ideas can be extended beyond the boundaries
of these two countries.
Sardar Sarovar Dam Project in India's Narmada Valley to go forward attest to the continuing
nature of the problem. According to one account, the World Bank decided to go forward
with a $450 million loan for the project long before the EIA studies were complete. In 1991,
as concerns about the project mounted, however, the Bank commissioned an independent
review of the project. "The review was scathing and attacked virtually every aspect of the
program, including the bank's participation." See Molly More, India's Lifeline or Man-Made
Disaster, WAsH. Posr, Aug. 24, 1993, at A12. Still, the Bank continued funding until March
1993, when a series of new conditions were imposed. Rather than accept the conditions, the
Indian government gave up further World Bank funding. By this time, however, the project
was six years into construction, and work on the project continues today. Id.

